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ABSTRACT 
Police militarization is a complex subject with significant homeland 
security implications. Efforts to implement militarization reform without a clear 
understanding of the issue could negatively impact law enforcement’s ability to 
respond to emerging threats from terrorism, homegrown violent extremism, and 
armed criminals. Conversely, unfettered militarization of domestic policing could 
result in abuse of authority and loss of public confidence. This thesis proposes a 
nuanced definition of police militarization based on existing literature. The 
research then examines the correlation between violence and police 
militarization. A statistical analysis of crime data found an inverse relationship 
between levels of reported violence and militarization. However, the research 
discovered a strong nexus between perceptions of violence by the police and 
efforts to militarize. Social identity theory was used to explain why isolated acts of 
violence against police officers are perceived as attacks on the law enforcement 
community and lead to deep social divisions between the police and the public. 
This socially constructed reality of violence, which is reinforced by the media and 
training, has a powerful effect on police attitudes and behavior. The conclusion is 
that police militarization has been influenced by violence, and appropriate levels 
of militarized capabilities are needed to protect both the police and the public. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
At various times in American history, the topic of police militarization has 
surfaced. The most recent event to spark debate about the issue was the August 
9, 2014, shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. The media portrayal 
of the aggressive police response to the civil disobedience and rioting that 
followed the exoneration of the involved police officer resulted in a harsh critique 
of police equipment and tactics. The immediate response was a call for reform 
despite the lack of any clear definition of what constituted police militarization or 
an understanding of what has caused it. 
Police militarization is a complicated issue influenced by many 
interconnected factors. The primary goal of this thesis is to determine the 
correlation between violence and police militarization. This relationship is an 
important aspect of the militarization debate because critics and supporters both 
refer to levels of violence to justify their positions. Critics of police militarization 
argue that levels of violence are decreasing and the dangers of policing are at 
all-time lows, therefore negating the need to accumulate military-style weapons 
and equipment. Proponents argue that some degree of police militarization is 
necessary to combat emerging threats of violence from terrorists, homegrown 
violent extremists, and armed criminals. Due to the controversy surrounding the 
topic, policy makers have begun to draft legislation to limit certain aspects of 
police militarization. However, implementing any type of militarization reform 
without a fundamental understanding of the issue could have unintended 
consequences that may negatively impact the police and the public. 
To frame the research properly, it is necessary to define police 
militarization and clearly distinguish it from other issues facing law enforcement, 
such as race relations and the use of deadly and/or excessive force. Much of the 
existing literature simply acknowledges that police militarization exists and 
focuses its critique on certain aspects of the issue, such as weapons, equipment, 
and paramilitary police units (e.g., special weapons and tactics [SWAT] teams). 
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By reviewing the existing literature on the topic, and applying some generally 
accepted key terms, a nuanced definition of police militarization was developed. 
Based on this analysis, police militarization is defined as the adoption of military-
style equipment, tactics, and/or policies that leverage force, or the threat of force, 
as the primary means to achieve a law enforcement agency’s goals.  
This definition makes the use or threat of force the key element of police 
militarization, not equipment, which is a key distinction because much of the 
modern debate has focused on military surplus equipment. For example, the use 
of armored personnel carriers by the police has been cited as an indicator of 
police militarization despite the fact that its purpose is to protect both police 
officers and the public from harm during armed conflict.  
It is also important to consider that under the decentralized system of 
policing utilized in the United States, the adoption of police militarization as a 
systemic methodology is unlikely. Rather, militarized police responses are 
typically employed as needed to mitigate specific violent incidents, such as active 
shooter and hostage/barricade situations. Such violent incidents typically 
necessitate a more aggressive response to minimize the impact of these high 
consequence events.  
The research then focused on the correlation between violence and police 
militarization. The research began with a detailed statistical analysis of national 
crime data from 1987–2015. The specific time frame was chosen because it 
corresponded with documented increases in police militarization during the “war 
on drugs” in the 1980s, the “war on crime” in the 1990s, and the “war on terror” in 
the 2000s. The following data sets were analyzed. 
• law enforcement line of duty deaths from felonious acts 
• felonious assaults on law enforcement 
• ambush attacks against law enforcement 
• violent crime rates 
• active shooter incidents 
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The analysis revealed that each of these categories of violent crime 
experienced a decline during the time frame examined with the exception of 
active shooter incidents and ambush deaths. However, the analysis also showed 
significant problems with interpreting the data. First, the statistics are a reflection 
of reported crime. A significant difference appears to exist in reported crime rates 
as found in the FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) and other measures of crime, 
such as the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). This difference 
indicates that a significant number of violent crimes may go unreported. Second, 
the national aggregate data is not representative of the violent crime rates in 
many communities. Many cities were experiencing significant increases in violent 
crime during the period of time studied. 
Despite data indicating that violent crime rates were generally declining, 
many in the law enforcement community claimed their accumulation of military 
equipment and tactics were a response to escalating rates of violent crime. 
Examining this contradiction led to the most significant finding of this research 
project. By applying social identity theory to law enforcement as a distinct in-
group, it was discovered that perceptions of violence by police officers are not 
solely contingent upon crime data. Rather, police officers develop a socially 
constructed perception of violence that is strongly influenced by a number of 
factors including their personal and vicarious experiences, as well as their 
training and media portrayals of violence incidents.  
Social identity theory also offers an explanation for law enforcement’s 
efforts to militarize. The theory posits that human beings have an innate desire to 
belong to distinct groups with positive identities. Research shows that police 
officers develop very strong social identities through a process of social 
categorization. This process causes members of the in-group to enhance their 
status by exaggerating differences in those outside the in-group. The 
distinctiveness of the police identity is strengthened by the uncertainty involved in 
their work and the power of their collective experience. As a result of law 
enforcement’s strong group identity, any incident of violence directed at an 
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individual police officer is often viewed as an attack on the entire in-group. This 
ever expanding collection of negative experiences enhances feelings of 
vulnerability and uncertainty, which can result in behavior that appears 
disproportionate to the actual threat.  
By understanding how social identity affects law enforcement’s perception 
of violence, it can be seen that police militarization is at least partially a response 
to the threat of violence as perceived by those in law enforcement and is not 
based on the actual threat of violence in a particular community. 
The conclusion reached in this thesis is that uninformed or misguided 
efforts at police militarization reform could actually make the police and public 
less safe and further erode relations between the two. Increasing law 
enforcement’s perception of vulnerability by limiting access to the tools and 
tactics they need to protect themselves and effectively respond to acts of 
violence, will cause the police to distance themselves further from the 
community. This perceived vulnerability could result in the unnecessary 
escalation of ambiguous incidents by police due to their enhanced communal 
perception of violence.  
The fact is, extreme acts of violence will continue to occur in the United 
States. Despite arguments to the contrary, the technology, equipment, and 
tactics employed by the military are often the most effective at enabling law 
enforcement to accomplish their mission in the safest and most efficient manner 
possible. The challenge for policy makers and law enforcement leaders is to 
implement police militarization reform that reduces law enforcement’s perception 
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At various times in American history, the topic of police militarization has 
surfaced, usually the result of law enforcement’s response to a social movement 
or significant public event. For example, the civil rights movement, the war on 
drugs, and the war on terrorism, all led to discussions about police militarization.1 
The current debate about the topic began with the 2014 shooting of Michael 
Brown by police in Ferguson, Missouri. Law enforcement’s response to the 
rioting that followed the exoneration of the involved police officer immediately 
came under scrutiny as pictures of rifle carrying officers in battle dress uniforms, 
silhouetted by menacing looking armored vehicles, surfaced in the media.2 
These images and their shock-inspired headlines painted an ominous picture of 
modern policing.  
Since Ferguson, a seemingly endless series of high profile and 
controversial incidents have occurred that involved the application of force by 
police officers. These incidents have triggered a national debate about the use of 
military equipment and tactics by law enforcement. Unfortunately, little effort has 
been made to define police militarization or offer any explanation as to why it has 
occurred. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The issue of police militarization has become a polarizing topic. Critics 
argue that police militarization leads to abuses of authority and a subtle shift 
towards a “police state.”3 Much of the current focus has been on the Department 
of Defense (DOD) 1033 Program, which allows the transfer of military surplus 
                                            
1 Peter B. Kraska, “Militarization and Policing—Its Relevance to 21st Century Police,” 
Policing 1, no. 4 (November 7, 2007): 505, doi:10.1093/police/pam065. 
2 “How America’s Police Became an Army: The 1033 Program,” Newsweek, August 13, 
2014, http://www.newsweek.com/how-americas-police-became-army-1033-program-264537. 
3 John Whitehead and Nat Hentoff, A Government of Wolves: The Emerging American Police 
State (New York: SelectBooks, 2013), 23–30. 
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equipment to law enforcement agencies. Since 1997, the Defense Logistics 
Agency has transferred hundreds of millions of dollars worth of unused military 
equipment to police agencies across the United States (U.S.).4 Opponents argue 
that this equipment has been unnecessary and inappropriate for use by law 
enforcement, despite the fact that much of the equipment obtained through the 
DOD 1033 Program has no nexus to combat.5  
The debate surrounding the topic of police militarization has primarily 
focused on the issue of violence. Selective use of violent crime statistics by both 
supporters and critics of police militarization have added to the confusion 
surrounding the issue. For example, some critics argue that policing is actually 
less dangerous than ever; therefore, negating the need for any military 
equipment.6 They also argue that the military equipment obtained under the 
guise of violence has promoted the adoption of military tactics, which endanger 
the public and erode civil liberties. Numerous examples of alleged abuses by 
police agencies are cited by the ACLU in its June 2014 publication entitled “War 
Comes Home—The Excessive Militarization of American Policing.”7 The political 
response has been in the form of legislation, which would prevent federal, state, 
and local police from receiving broad categories of military-grade equipment, and 
in some cases, require equipment already received and in use to be returned.8  
                                            
4 Justin Bachman, “A Federal Effort to Reuse Military Gear Turned Cops into Commandos,” 
BusinessWeek: Politics_and_policy, August 14, 2014, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/ 
2014-08-14/ferguson-shooting-how-military-gear-ended-up-with-local-police. 
5 Executive Office of the President, Review: Federal Support for Local Law Enforcement 
Equipment Acquisition (Washington, DC: The White House, 2014), 3, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/docs/federal_support_for_local_law_enforcement_equipment_acquisition.pdf. 
6 Radley Balko, “Five Myths about America’s Police,” Washington Post, December 5, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-americas-police/2014/12/05/ 
35b1af44-7bcd-11e4-9a27-6fdbc612bff8_story.html. 
7 Kara Dansky, “War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing,” 
American Civil Liberties Union, June 2014, https://www.aclu.org/war-comes-home-excessive-
militarization-american-policing. 
8 Evan Perez, “First Post-Ferguson Legislation Aims to Curb Police ‘Militarization,’” CNN, 
September 19, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/19/politics/coburn-bill-police-militarization/ 
index.html. 
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Other critics argue that the most significant effect of militarization has 
been on police culture. They claim that militarization has promoted an overly 
aggressive form of policing that embraces force as the primary means to solve 
social problems, encourages the use of unnecessary and excessive force, and 
teaches officers to treat citizens as enemies.9 
Supporters believe that some degree of police militarization has been 
necessary for law enforcement to combat emerging threats from terrorism, 
homegrown violent extremism, and attacks by heavily armed violent criminals.10 
They argue police have been forced to use military-style weapons and protective 
equipment to keep pace with an ever-changing adversary.11 
The potential ramifications of the police militarization debate are 
substantial. At one end of the spectrum, policies addressing militarization could 
render the police ineffective at protecting the public or themselves from 
numerous emerging threats. At the other end of the spectrum, unfettered 
militarized police activity could severely erode civil liberties and result in a 
significant loss of public support and funding.  
The effectiveness of the police is largely dependent upon public support 
and that support is contingent upon the public’s view that the police are 
exercising their authority in a legitimate manner.12 Constant scrutiny is 
necessary, as police are given such an extraordinary amount of authority. The 
issue of police militarization must be properly analyzed to ensure law 
enforcement retains its legitimacy and public support.  
                                            
9 Radley Balko, Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America’s Police Forces, 1st 
Trade Paper edition (New York: PublicAffairs, 2014). 
10 “The Justified ‘Militarization’ of America’s Police,” August 25, 2014, http://chiefsview. 
com/2014/08/25/the-justified-militarization-of-americas-police/. 
11 Garth den Heyer, “Mayberry Revisited: A Review of the Influence of Police Paramilitary 
Units on Policing,” Policing and Society 24, no. 3 (May 27, 2014): 346–61, doi:10.1080/10439463. 
2013.784304. 
12 Jason Sunshine and Tom R. Tyler, “The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in 
Shaping Public Support for Policing,” Law & Society Review 37, no. 3 (2003): 534–535. 
 4 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
While the effects of police militarization are being debated, little doubt 
remains that some degree of military influence on law enforcement has 
occurred.13 Evidence can be found in police organization/structure, tactics, 
technology, and equipment. What is unclear is why the police are becoming 
militarized and what effect it has had on policing.  
Many police departments across the country have justified their acquisition 
of military weapons and equipment, as well as the use of paramilitary policing 
units (aka special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams) by citing the rising level of 
violence police officers are now facing.14 Critics of police militarization argue that 
the level of violence faced by police officers has actually decreased and does not 
justify efforts to militarize.15 Some have argued that the tremendous amount of 
free military equipment being provided to law enforcement agencies have caused 
militarization.16 Growing evidence is also available that police training and culture 
are contributing to militarization. While militarization can result from many 
possible causes, several of which are interdependent, this research project 
focuses specifically on violence. The primary question this research project will 
answer is “Does the level of violence confronting law enforcement justify the 
militarization of domestic policing in the United States?” 
The answer to this question is integral to the implementation of policy 
reforms related to police militarization. The answer is also likely to trigger many 
other questions equally important to consider. For example, if police militarization 
is not directly attributable to violence, why is it occurring? Have the police 
intentionally adopted a military culture or is the manner in which they are trained 
and indoctrinated into the profession causing this shift? Has the acquisition of 
                                            
13 Karl Bickel, “Will the Growing Militarization of Our Police Doom Community Policing?,” 
COPS Office 6, no. 12 (December 2013), http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/12-2013/will_the_ 
growing_militarization_of_our_police_doom_community_policing.asp. 
14 “The Justified ‘Militarization’ of America’s Police.” 
15 Balko, “Five Myths about America’s Police.” 
16 “How America’s Police Became an Army.” 
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military surplus equipment actually been the result of economic challenges facing 
law enforcement agencies rather than the result of tactical necessity? Perhaps 
police militarization is indicative of a changing law enforcement mission? While 
the answer to many of these questions is beyond the scope of this project, 
determining whether or not police militarization is being caused by violence will at 
least properly frame future discussion.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Very little academic work has been done on the subject of police 
militarization. This is especially true when compared to the available literature on 
other issues in policing such as misconduct, race relations, and the use of force, 
which is, perhaps, the result of confusion as to what police militarization means 
and what has caused it. This review examines the available literature on the topic 
of police militarization to establish the general body of knowledge to date. 
As stated previously, the August 9, 2014 police shooting in Ferguson, 
Missouri reignited the police militarization debate. Media reporting of the 
Ferguson incident became a critique of police equipment, tactics, attitudes, and 
public trust. However, it was not the first time that police militarization had been a 
topic for discussion. Military interaction with and influence on policing has been a 
topic of concern in the United States since the American Revolution.17 During 
this era, the focus was on the use of the military for domestic security. The 
Founding Fathers were particularly sensitive to the oppressive effects of the “use 
of military force in the enforcement of civil law.”18 This sensitivity led to numerous 
regulations including the Posse Comitatus Act, which generally prohibited the 
                                            
17 Diane Cecilia Weber, “Warrior Cops—The Ominous Growth of Paramilitarism in American 
Police Departments,” CATO Institute Briefing Papers 50 (1999): 3, http://www.decuslib.com/ 
decus/vmslt99b/net/police-and-military50.pdf. 
18 Robert Croakley, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1789–1878 
(Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1988), 3. 
 6 
use of the military to perform civilian law enforcement functions.19 While the 
appropriate use of the military domestically is still debated widely, the more 
relevant issue recently has been the militarization of domestic law enforcement 
agencies. Controversy regarding police militarization was clearly seen during the 
waning support for the “War on Drugs” in the 1980s and 1990s, and the “War on 
Terror” from 2001 to present.20 
The literature on the subject of police militarization is broadly divided into 
five general categories. Each focuses on different aspects of the topic.  
D. DEFINITIONS: MILITARISM, MILITARIZATION, AND PARAMILITARY 
Few attempts have been made to accurately define what police 
militarization is. Rather, the term is often used colloquially to mean any law 
enforcement equipment or tactic, which resembles something that might be seen 
on a military battlefield.21 However, the literature on the subject does reveal that 
several generally accepted terms do exist, which play an important part in 
understanding the general concept of police militarization.  
In his article entitled, “Militarizing American Police: The Rise and 
Normalization of Paramilitary Units,” Peter Kraska defines militarism as “a set of 
beliefs and values that stress the use of force and domination as appropriate 
means to solve problems and gain political power, while glorifying the tools to 
accomplish this—military power, hardware, and technology.”22 In his article 
entitled, “Militarization and Policing—Its Relevance to 21st Century Police,” 
Kraska defines militarization as the “implementation of the ideology, militarism. It 
                                            
19 Charles Doyle and Jennifer Elsea, The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: The 
Use of the Military to Execute Civilian Law (CRS Report No. R42659) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2012), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42659.pdf. 
20 Abigail R. Hall and Christopher J. Coyne, “The Militarization of U.S. Domestic Policing,” 
Independent Review 17, no. 4 (Spring 2013): 486–487. 
21 Hall and Coyne, “The Militarization of U.S. Domestic Policing.” 
22 Peter B. Kraska and Victor E. Kappeler, “Militarizing American Police: The Rise and 
Normalization of Paramilitary Units,” Social Problems 44, no. 1 (February 1, 1997): 1, 
doi:10.2307/3096870. 
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is the process of arming, organizing, planning, training for, and sometimes 
implementing violent conflict.”23 Other authors on the subject have accepted 
Kraska’s definitions to varying degrees. Stephen Hill and Randal Berger referred 
to Kraska’s definitions in their article, “A Paramilitary Policing Juggernaut” and 
surmise that militarization is actually “a process through which police agencies 
adopt an increasingly martial culture, organization, material, and modus 
operandi.”24  
Tomas Weiss argues that the debate about police militarization is flawed. 
He acknowledges that most scholars agree the police have been militarized, but 
argues that “traditional definitions of military are ambiguous” and that many 
authors “do not even define what they understand as ‘military’ and ‘police’—
unsurprisingly as there is no uncontested definition available.”25 An article 
entitled, “War Comes Home—The Excessive Militarization of American Policing,” 
by Kara Dansky of the American Civil Liberties Union, does not attempt to define 
the term militarization, yet spends considerable effort providing evidence that 
militarization has occurred.26 This effort occurs frequently in the literature. 
Another common term that appears in much of the literature is 
paramilitary. Peter A. J. Waddington argues that the term paramilitary is misused 
and is therefore misleading.27 Based on the contextual use of the term, many 
authors use the term paramilitary to mean anything resembling the military in 
appearance, organization, and/or tactics. Kraska, for instance, defines the term 
                                            
23 Kraska, “Militarization and Policing—Its Relevance to 21st Century Police,” 503. 
24 Stephen Hill and Randall Berger, “A Paramilitary Policing Juggernaut,” Social Justice 36, 
no. 1 (2009): 26. 
25 Tomáš Weiss, “The Blurring Border between the Police and the Military: A Debate without 
Foundations,” Cooperation and Conflict 46, no. 3 (September 1, 2011): 401, doi:10.1177/001 
0836711416961. 
26 Dansky, “War Comes Home.” 
27 Peter A. J. Waddington, “Swatting Police Paramilitarism: A Comment on Kraska and 
Paulsen,” Policing and Society 9, no. 2 (April 1, 1999): 127, doi:10.1080/10439463.1999.9964 
808. 
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paramilitary to mean, “forces organized after a military pattern.”28 Conversely, 
Waddington has adopted another commonly accepted definition of paramilitary: 
policing on behalf of the military, such as the French Gendarmerie and Italian 
Carabinieri.29 He goes on to state that the key difference is the degree to which 
paramilitary policing units “specialize in the use of a significant measure of 
force.”30 
E. EVIDENCE OF POLICE MILITARIZATION 
The fact that a clear consensus does not exist as to what police 
militarization means is problematic. Without the benefit of a clear definition and 
universally accepted attributes, proving that police militarization has occurred is 
difficult. Much of the literature simply states that police militarization has occurred 
with little or no evidence offered in support. In lieu of empirical data, many 
authors simply describe what they believe police militarization looks like and offer 
arbitrary facts to support their claims. For instance, several articles use as 
evidence the labeling of crime control efforts with military terms, such as the “war 
on crime” and the “war on terror.”31 Few address the fact that the terms “war on 
crime” and the “war on terror” were first adopted by politicians to garner support 
for their economic and political agendas.32 Nevertheless, critics argue that the 
use of military jargon is evidence of the adoption of a military culture by law 
enforcement. Further, they argue that this military culture increasingly divides the 
police from the public by creating a mentality that the citizens are the enemy and 
the streets are a war zone.33 Radley Balko’s book entitled, Rise of the Warrior 
                                            
28 Peter B. Kraska, “Questioning the Militarization of U.S. Police: Critical versus Advocacy 
Scholarship∗,” Policing and Society 9, no. 2 (April 1999): 147, doi:10.1080/10439463.1999.9964 
809. 
29 Waddington, “Swatting Police Paramilitarism,” 128. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Whitehead and Hentoff, A Government of Wolves, 7. 
32 Peter B. Kraska, Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System: The Changing Roles 
of the Armed Forces and the Police (Boston: Northeastern, 2001), 19–20. 
33 Weber, “Warrior Cops—The Ominous Growth of Paramilitarism in American Police 
Departments,” 10. 
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Cop: The Militarization of American Police Forces, spends considerable time 
addressing what he refers to as the dominant military culture within modern 
police agencies, but offers only anecdotal evidence of such.34  
Actual attempts to demonstrate that police militarization has occurred 
through empirical research are scarce. Peter Kraska attempted to find some 
measurable evidence of militarization by focusing on the proliferation of 
paramilitary police units (PPUs), aka SWAT teams, and their expanded use 
during routine police activities. His research compares the number of PPUs 
employed by police agencies in the 1960s with the number of PPUs reported in 
1995. According to his research, the use of PPUs by small jurisdictions increased 
157 percent during that time period.35 In an article entitled, “Militarizing American 
Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Unites, Kraska and Kappeler 
again compare the number of formal PPUs in use from 1960 to 1995. They 
focused on the changing roles and expanded use of PPU’s throughout the 
study’s time period. Their conclusion is that the number of PPUs used by law 
enforcement agencies has risen exponentially and the frequency of their use has 
increased tremendously.36  
Evidence is also available that PPU activities have expanded from 
traditional roles involving hostage/barricades, terrorism, and active shooter 
situations, to activities, such as warrant service and drug raids.37 In an article 
entitled, “Grounded Research into U.S. Paramilitary Policing: Forcing the Iron 
Fist Inside the Velvet Glove,” Kraska and Paulsen determined that the expanded 
use of PPUs is partially because officers assigned to these units found it to be a 
                                            
34 Balko, Rise of the Warrior Cop. 
35 Kraska, “Questioning the Militarization of U.S. Police,” 152. 
36 Kraska and Kappeler, “Militarizing American Police,” 12. 
37 Ibid., 6–7. 
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pleasurable experience.38 However, their assertions were based on the study of 
a single police agency, and therefore, have limited utility.  
Dansky’s ACLU article also focuses almost exclusively on SWAT team 
operations as evidence of police militarization. She accomplishes her critique of 
police militarization by discussing a few tragic incidents in which SWAT 
operations resulted in death or severe injuries.39 Unfortunately, she attributes 
these botched SWAT operations to militarization rather than exploring the root of 
these failures. Many of the examples she cited could have been the result of 
inadequate training or the inherent dangers associated with ambiguous, volatile, 
and dynamic environments. By failing to acknowledge these possibilities, her 
argument loses some credibility. However, her views and those of the ACLU are 
representative of much of the current discourse on the subject. 
Garth den Heyer offers an interesting counter to Dansky’s article. He 
posits that the proliferation of SWAT teams has been a necessary response to a 
changing threat environment.40 Heyer goes on to state, “The current risk or 
danger in regard to PPU/SWAT Units in America is not the increase in their 
numbers or the increase in their rate of deployment or even their weapons, but is 
in their lack of preparation before deployment, their use of intelligence, the tactics 
employed on the scene and their professionalism.”41 Heyer’s key point is that a 
distinction exists between police militarization and operational failures. 
F. MILITARY SURPLUS 
Another common theme in the literature is the effect of military equipment 
and technology on policing. The federal programs that make this equipment 
available to law enforcement are also the subject of much of the current debate. 
                                            
38 Peter B. Kraska and Derek J. Paulsen, “Grounded Research into U.S. Paramilitary 
Policing: Forging the Iron Fist inside the Velvet Glove,” Policing and Society 7, no. 4 (August 
1997): 267, doi:10.1080/10439463.1997.9964777. 
39 Dansky, “War Comes Home.” 
40 den Heyer, “Mayberry Revisited,” 351. 
41 Ibid., 359. 
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Several articles discuss the fact that police departments throughout the country 
have received massive amounts of military weapons and equipment.42 Their 
contention is that this equipment has resulted in a significant change in police 
culture and tactics. Dansky is particularly critical of the military surplus program. 
She argues the federal government essentially incentivized the militarization of 
the police by allowing the distribution of military weapons and equipment without 
a justification of need.43 Once police agencies received this equipment, they felt 
a responsibility to develop tactics to incorporate the equipment into operations, 
regardless of its utility for the situation. This distribution resulted in many police 
agencies attempting to form SWAT teams and engage in unconventional 
missions that larger, more capable police departments had previously handled. 
Dansky argues that the tendency to adopt new responsibilities unilaterally, aka 
mission creep, is dangerous.44 Weber stated, “the modern SWAT team was born 
of public fear and the perception by police that crime had reached such 
proportions and criminals had become so invincible that more armament and 
more training were needed.”45  
Hall and Coyne argue that the accelerated transfer of military equipment 
to police agencies since the 9/11 terror attacks has exacerbated the problems 
associated with militarization.46 They state, “By providing weapons, training, and 
other resources to the police, the military effectively augments the power of its 
various agencies and the number of personnel under its influence.”47 Hill and 
Berger make the point that significant military training and consultation often 
followed the 1.2 million pieces of equipment transferred to police agencies, which 
                                            
42 Weber, “Warrior Cops—The Ominous Growth of Paramilitarism in American Police 
Departments.” 
43 Dansky, “War Comes Home,” 24–25. 
44 Ibid., 25. 
45 Weber, “Warrior Cops—The Ominous Growth of Paramilitarism in American Police 
Departments,” 6. 
46 Hall and Coyne, “The Militarization of U.S. Domestic Policing,” 497. 
47 Ibid., 488. 
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added to the militarization effect.48 John Whitehead argues that the government 
is using fear to purposely erode freedom. This fear propaganda has enabled the 
police to acquire massive amounts of military equipment and adopt pervasive 
tactics.49 
G. ECONOMICS 
An important theme in some of the literature is the role of economics in 
militarization. Hall and Coyne devote a significant amount of time discussing the 
economic influence on militarization in their article entitled, “The Militarization of 
U. S. Domestic Policing.” A key point in their work is that government agencies 
have an “inherent tendency to expand beyond their initial aims and goals.”50 
They also point to the “war on drugs” and the “war on terror” as key drivers of 
militarization stating that “crises, whether they are actual or merely perceived (for 
example, the threat of drug gangs, terrorism, nuclear war, and so forth), provide 
an opportunity for government to increase in size and scope.”51 Several other 
authors note that mission creep is often the result of economic incentives to 
obtain equipment and capabilities. Dansky’s article supports this notion by citing 
examples of small police departments that obtained military style equipment, 
such as armored personnel carriers due to claimed concerns of terrorism despite 
little evidence that such a threat existed.52 Still others acknowledge the economic 
and cultural effect of globalization and terrorism on modern policing, and argue 
that the challenges of the homeland security mission have ushered in a new 
policing paradigm.53 In their article entitled, “Soldiers as Police Offers/Police 
Officers as Soldiers: Role Evolution and Revolution in the United States”, Donald 
and Kathleen Campbell point to the events of 9/11 as the catalyst for changes in 
                                            
48 Hill and Berger, “A Paramilitary Policing Juggernaut,” 30. 
49 Whitehead and Hentoff, A Government of Wolves, 7. 
50 Hall and Coyne, “The Militarization of U.S. Domestic Policing,” 500. 
51 Ibid., 489. 
52 Dansky, “War Comes Home,” 26. 
53 Steven G. Brandl, “Back to the Future: The Implications of September 11, 2001 on Law 
Enforcement Practice and Policy,” Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 1 (2003): 144. 
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domestic policing due to the fading distinction between crime, terrorism, and 
war.54  
H. CULTURE 
There is also disagreement as to the net effect of police militarization. 
Kraska and other critics argue that the real danger of police militarization is the 
change in police culture. As the police become militarized, they adopt a “warrior” 
mindset that changes how the public is perceived.55 Kraska in particular devotes 
considerable time discussing the effects of the paramilitary culture. One of the 
adverse effects of militarization discussed by several authors is the alienation of 
the public. As police officers become more militarized, they form strong bonds or 
“esprit de corps…which serves to perpetuate alienation and separation from the 
public.”56 This notion seems to be supported by Henri Tajfel’s work in social 
identity theory.57  
Waddington argues that Kraska and others are mistaken. He believes that 
the police have their own culture, which is distinct from the military in many ways 
and is built on the tenet that the police are obligated to protect the sanctity of 
citizenship.58 There is also disagreement that the military’s influence on policing 
is bad. Sergio Herzog states that the professionalization of the police, which 
occurred during the first half of the 20th century, required a “centralized 
organizational structure, a hierarchical chain of command, authoritative 
leadership, uniform outward appearance, top-down communication by means of 
order and directives and down-up action reporting, and internal control over rank 
                                            
54 Donald J. Campbell and Kathleen M. Campbell, “Soldiers as Police Officers/ Police 
Officers as Soldiers: Role Evolution and Revolution in the United States,” Armed Forces & 
Society 36, no. 2 (January 1, 2010): 337, doi:10.1177/0095327X09335945. 
55 Kraska and Paulsen, “Grounded Research into U.S. Paramilitary Policing,” 260–267. 
56 Sergio Herzog, “Militarization and Demilitarization Processes in the Israeli and American 
Police Forces: Organizational and Social Aspects,” Policing and Society 11, no. 2 (May 2001): 
188, doi:10.1080/10439463.2001.9964861. 
57 Henri Tajfel, ed., Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
58 Waddington, “Swatting Police Paramilitarism,” 132. 
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and file by commanders through strong internal discipline.”59 He also argues that 
military ideology is not limited to overwhelming force, but rather “order, discipline, 
and self-sacrifice.”60 
I. CONCLUSION 
A last observation of particular interest is that the literature seemed to 
reflect a softening on the subject of police militarization immediately after 9/11. 
The most notable author on the subject, Peter Kraska, stated in 2007, “I want to 
concede upfront that the positive virtues the military model brings to the policing 
table have not been discussed.” He went on to say, “To many people, even 
among academics, the military model represents constraint, discipline, honor, 
control, competence, and a type of patriotism.”61 However, a reversal of that 
softening in the media has occurred since the events in Ferguson. 
A thorough analysis of the literature related to police militarization reveals 
a wide range of ideas, opinions, and evidence. Despite very different 
perspectives on the subject, each source provides valuable insight into this timely 
and relevant subject. The flurry of interest related to the topic that has emerged 
since the Ferguson incident will likely result in further exploration of this complex 
topic. The dearth of literature makes it clear that additional research is needed to 
inform future policy decisions.  
J. METHODOLOGY 
Police militarization is a complicated and multifaceted issue. History 
reveals that police militarization has been a concern for as long as formal policing 
has existed. When Sir Robert Peel created the London Metropolitan Police in 
1829, he made them wear blue uniforms to distinguish the police from the British 
military who wore red. He also prohibited the carrying of firearms out of fear it 
                                            
59 Herzog, “Militarization and Demilitarization Processes in the Israeli and American Police 
Forces,” 181. 
60 Ibid., 183. 
61 Kraska, “Militarization and Policing—Its Relevance to 21st Century Police,” 511. 
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would alienate the public.62 Peel’s concerns about the effect of militarization on 
society reflect much of the current discourse on the topic. Little effort has been 
spent on defining police militarization and exploring its cause. As such, no 
comprehensive policy regarding police militarization has been developed that 
could potentially meet the needs of both the community and the police. 
This project is comprised of three primary exploratory chapters, each 
employing distinct methodologies. Chapter II explores the various components of 
police militarization and concludes with a comprehensive and nuanced definition 
of police militarization through an extensive analysis of the existing literature 
related to the topic. Since no clear definition of police militarization existed, it was 
necessary to piece together various components of the topic and identify gaps 
and misconceptions. Establishing a clear definition of police militarization is an 
important prerequisite to understanding its cause and effect.  
Chapter III is a comprehensive statistical analysis of violence directly 
related to law enforcement that examines three decades of violent crime data 
obtained through open source reporting. The majority of the data was extracted 
from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports. The specific categories of violence 
examined were the following. 
• law enforcement line of duty deaths due to felonious acts 
• felonious assaults on law enforcement 
• ambush attacks against law enforcement  
• violent crime rates (murder and non-negligent manslaughter, rape, 
robbery, and aggravated assault) 
• active shooter incidents 
For each category of violence, the data was analyzed to determine trends that 
might have contributed to the adoption of militarized policing methods or 
challenge the legitimacy of the current levels of police militarization. 
                                            
62 “Sir Robert Peel and His ‘Bobbies,’” accessed June 18, 2015, http://www.historic-
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Chapter IV is an in-depth analysis of the complex social and psychological 
processes that affects how police officers perceive violence through the lens of 
social identity. An extensive examination of literature pertaining to social identity 
theory was required with a focus on the dynamics of in-group relations within 
policing. Those concepts were then used to explain how law enforcement officers 
develop a socially constructed perception of violence and how it affects their 
behavior.  
The analysis then expanded to included two key factors, which were 
identified as having a strong influence on social perception. The first is the role of 
the media in establishing narratives not necessarily consistent with reality. The 
second is how police training strengthens social identity and influences 
perceptions of violence. Numerous academic works show a strong correlation 
between these key factors and law enforcement’s perception of the threat of 
violence. Evidence is presented in support of the theory that socially constructed 
realities strongly influence law enforcement’s subsequent adoption of militarized 
policing methods.  
Chapter V leverages the information presented in the previous chapters to 
create a framework for the development of appropriate militarized response 
capabilities based on current capabilities and emerging threats. 
The analysis presented in these chapters explains how violence has been 
used to both justify and vilify the various components of police militarization. 
Establishing a clear understanding of the reasons why law enforcement has 
militarized will enable law enforcement and political leaders to make sound 
decisions regarding the acquisition of military equipment and the application of 
militarized policing tactics. Those educated decisions will ensure the 
appropriately balance of liberty and security.  
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II. DEFINING POLICE MILITARIZATION 
There is a big difference between our military and our local law 
enforcement and we don’t want those lines blurred. 
~President Obama—8/18/14 
While the events in Ferguson, Missouri, reignited the debate about police 
militarization, little effort has been made to define what the term means. 
However, that lack of a definition has not prevented the media from reporting on 
the topic. A Google search of the term “POLICE MILITARIZATION” conducted 
six months after the Ferguson incident produced 1.47 million results. Without a 
clear definition of the term, reporting on the topic ranged from issues of race 
relations and biased policing to the types of uniforms being worn by the police 
officers.  
This chapter examines the various components of police militarization and 
presents a comprehensive definition meant to inform future debate.  
A. TYPES OF POLICING 
To begin to understand what police militarization is, it is important to 
establish some context. This project is focused on the issue of police 
militarization within the American system of law enforcement; an important 
distinction because the issue of police militarization has not been solely a 
problem in the United States.63 Other nations with similar systems of policing 
have also expressed concern about the role and influence of the military on law 
enforcement.64 Since the system of policing utilized by a nation seems to be at 
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least a nominal factor affecting attitudes about police militarization, it is useful to 
differentiate between the different primary systems of policing that exist.  
According to Nadav Morag, three primary types of policing systems are 
utilized worldwide: centralized, Napoleonic, and decentralized.65 The centralized 
system has a single, national police force with a central command structure.66 
Japan, New Zealand, and Sweden are among many countries that have a 
centralized law enforcement system and employ a national police force in various 
forms. 
The Napoleonic system leverages military and civilian police units to 
enforce laws and provide domestic security.67 For example, the French criminal 
justice system is comprised of three main police agencies: the Police Nationale, 
the Gendarmerie Nationale, and the Compagnie Républicaine de la Sécurité.68 
The Gendarmerie Nationale is actually part of the Army and controlled by the 
Ministry of Defence.69 They investigate crimes, provide public security, and 
protect critical infrastructure. However, the military also equips and trains them to 
handle difficult missions. For example, the Gendarmerie Nationale Intervention 
Group (GIGN) is an elite special operations unit that can be deployed both 
domestically and abroad to deal with incidents, such as terrorism, violent crime, 
hostage taking, and prison riots.70  
The decentralized system employs numerous police agencies with no 
unified command structure.71 The United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and 
                                            
65 Nadav Morag, Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons (Hoboken, NJ: John 
Wiley & Sons, 2011), 147. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 “The French Police,” accessed April 17, 2015, https://www.justlanded.com/english/ 
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69 Ibid. 
70 “French National Gendarmerie,” accessed April 17, 2015, http://www.fiep.org/member-
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others utilize a decentralized system.72 Nevertheless, even among nations that 
use the decentralized system, the United States is unique. It is comprised of 
nearly 18,000 individual law enforcement organizations, which is far more than 
other countries.73 Each of these agencies varies greatly in size, structure, 
authority, and capability.74 For these reasons, police militarization in the United 
States is a complicated issue and one not easily defined. However, this 
decentralized law enforcement structure also makes the suggestion that police 
militarization could lead to a police state highly unlikely, as it would require the 
unified effort of 18,000 government agencies that are subject to various degrees 
of civilian oversight.75 
B. POLICE VS. MILITARY 
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, police is defined as “the function of 
that branch of the administrative machinery of government which is charged with 
the preservation of public order and tranquility, the promotion of the public health, 
safety, and morals, and the prevention, detection, and punishment of crimes.”76 
An alternative definition is “A body sanctioned by local, state, or national 
government to enforce laws and apprehend those who break them.”77 In the 
United States, the police refer to civilian law enforcement agencies of the federal, 
state, and local executive branch of government. 
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The U.S. military refers to the DOD and the five branches of the armed 
forces: Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.78 The DOD is 
charged with “provid[ing] the military forces needed to deter war and to protect 
the security of our country.”79 Despite having a dual role as state militia and 
federal military, the National Guard is considered a vital part of the DOD. For 
instance, Title 10 USC authorized POTUS to order the National Guard to active 
duty in support of national defense missions, while Title 32 USC establishes the 
National Guard as an authorized state militia.80  
Based on these very simple definitions, the following distinction between 
the police and the military can be made. The police exist to enforce the law and 
investigate criminal activity. The military is charged with waging war and 
protecting the security of the nation. The police certainly have a homeland 
security mission as well, but it also is essentially a function of their mandate to 
enforce laws. Another distinction is that the DOD is charged with defending the 
nation from security threats overseas.81  
However, the missions of the police and the military often overlap. In an 
article entitled, “Who’s in Charge?: New Challenges in Homeland Defense and 
Security,” Thomas Gross makes the case that the traditional lines between the 
police and the military have become obfuscated. He stated: 
In the middle is a ‘seam’ of ambiguity, where threats are neither 
clearly national security threats (requiring a military [DOD] response 
capability) nor clearly law enforcement threats (requiring a non-
military response capability from the Department of Homeland 
Security [DHS], the Department of Justice [DOJ], or other agency). 
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Along this ‘seam’ are threats such as transnational terrorist groups 
who challenge the delineation of responsibility between DOD and 
DHS, DOJ, or other agencies, because it is difficult to label them as 
either a national security threat or a law enforcement threat. 
Determining whether a particular adversary is one or the other will 
depend on the circumstances at the time and who is most capable 
to lead the nation’s efforts.82  
Figure 1. Current National Challenge 
 
From Thomas Goss, “‘Who’s in Charge?’ New Challenges in Homeland Defense 
and Homeland Security,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 1 (April 2006): 4, 
https://www.hsaj.org/articles/173. 
This modern blending of roles is further exacerbated by the inherent 
similarities between the two entities. Speaking to this issue, Donald and Kathleen 
Campbell wrote:  
[B]oth organizations have in common numerous other surface and 
substantive characteristics. These include distinctive uniforms and 
garb, an emphasis on hierarchical organizational structure, a heavy 
reliance on command and control, explicit and easily identifiable 
ranking relationships among members, and a greater than average 
concern for physical ability and strength. More substantively, 
society has granted both occupations the authority to use physical 
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force (including lethal force under specific circumstances) to carry 
out societal mandates.83 
Despite some overlap in the mission space, some essential differences 
occur between the police and the military. A significant difference is the ability of 
the military to engage in domestic law enforcement activities. 
C. POLICING BY THE MILITARY 
Military interaction with and influence on policing in the United States has 
been a topic of concern since the American Revolution.84 The Founding Fathers 
were particularly sensitive to the oppressive effects, both real and perceived, of 
the use of the military to enforce civil law. It was commonly believed that a 
“strong national army would pose a dangerous and potentially insurmountable 
threat to the autonomy and authority of the states within the fledgling Republic.”85 
The possibility of the military being used for law enforcement was strictly limited 
by the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. As found in 18 USC §1385, the Act reads, 
“Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the 
Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force 
as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”86  
It is important to understand that police militarization is a separate and 
distinct issue from policing by the military. The latter is regulated by numerous 
statutes and legal exceptions, which authorize the President to use military force 
to suppress rebellion and enforce federal law. Current versions of these laws are 
found in 10 USC §§ 331-335. Other regulations that permit the use of military 
information, equipment, and personnel in certain situations are found in 10 USC 
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§§ 371–382. Conversely, the militarization of the police is not specifically 
prohibited. 
D. MILITARIZATION OF POLICING 
The common image of police militarization, which has been perpetuated 
by the media, is that of a police officer flanked by an armored vehicle, carrying 
some sort of a military style weapon, wearing a non-traditional police uniform.87 
As such, much of the debate about militarization has focused on equipment and 
appearance. However, a deeper exploration of the concept reveals a much more 
complicated issue despite few attempts to define clearly what police militarization 
actually means. 
One of the most prolific authors on the subject of police militarization, 
Peter Kraska, has made several attempts to clarify key terms. Referring 
specifically to the terms “militarization” and “militarism,” he writes “Despite these 
terms’ pejorative undertones for some, they are most often used in academe as 
rigorous concepts that help us to think more clearly about the influence of war 
and the military model have on different aspects of society.”88 In an article 
entitled, “Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary 
Units,” Kraska defines militarism as “a set of beliefs and values that stress the 
use of force and domination as appropriate means to solve problems and gain 
political power, while glorifying the tools to accomplish this—military power, 
hardware, and technology.”89 Kraska later amended this definition to read “a set 
of beliefs, values, and assumptions that stress the use of force and threat of 
violence as the most appropriate and efficacious means to solve problems. It 
emphasizes the exercise of military power, hardware, organization, operations, 
and technology as its primary problem-solving tools.”90 According to Kraska, 
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appearance and equipment are contributing factors to militarism, but the most 
significant component is the application of overwhelming force. 
Another key term, militarization, is defined by Kraska as, “the 
implementation of the ideology of militarism. It is the process of arming, 
organizing, planning, training for, threatening, and sometimes implementing 
violent conflict.”91 Kraska states that police militarization is the “process whereby 
civilian police increasingly draw form, and pattern themselves around the tenets 
of militarism and the military model.”92 He proposes four categories, which 
provide indicators that the police are militarized:  
• material—martial weaponry, equipment, and advanced technology 
• culture—martial language, style (appearance, beliefs, and values 
• organizational—martial arrangements such as “command and 
control” centers [e.g. (COMPSTAT)], or elite squads of officers 
patterned after military special operations patrolling high-crime 
areas (as opposed to the traditional officer on the beat) 
• operational—patterns of activity modeled after the military, such as 
in the areas of intelligence, supervision, handling high-risk 
situations, or war making/restorations (e.g., weed and seed)93 
Kraska asserts that the degree to which a police organization has 
militarized can be measure using the dimensions found in Figure 2.94  
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Figure 2. Indicators of Militarization 
 
From Peter B. Kraska, “Militarization and Policing—Its Relevance to 21st Century 
Police,” Policing 1, no. 4 (November 7, 2007): 504. doi:10.1093/police/pam065. 
Others have echoed the sentiment that the mere existence of any of these 
indicators is insufficient to determine if a law enforcement agency (LEA) has 
become militarized. The reason is that the police are inherently militarized in 
structure, organization, and mission. According to Sergio Herzog: 
Police departments throughout the modern world tend to share an 
essentially military organizational structure and pattern of 
work…[These included] a centralized organizational structure, a 
hierarchical chain of command, authoritative leadership, uniform 
outward appearance, top-down communication by means of order 
and directives and down-up action reporting, and internal control 
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over rank-and-file by commanders through strong internal 
discipline.95  
It is important to keep these innate similarities in mind when attempting to 
determine what police militarization is. A common comparison is that the police 
and the military both wear uniforms. However, police uniforms have a much 
different impact on society.96 Studies have shown that police uniforms increase 
the public’s perception of the officer’s professionalism, competence, integrity, and 
intelligence.97 However, research suggested that public perceptions of the police 
were negatively affected when the police wore military combat style uniforms.98 
This perception explains why the use of military surplus uniforms by the police 
has been offered as evidence of police militarization. 
Another controversial manifestation of police militarization has been the 
use of SWAT teams. In their article, “Soldiers as Police Officers/Police Officers 
as Soldiers: Role Evolution and Revolution in the United States,” Donald and 
Kathleen Campbell focus on these specialized police teams. They state, “For 
police, militarization has taken the form of a rapid proliferation of police 
paramilitary units, that is, PPUs or SWAT teams modeled on the military special 
operations groups.”99  
Stephen Hill and Randall Berger expand the discussion to include 
paramilitary policing. They posit that paramilitary policing has multiple 
meanings.100 First, they refer to Robert Perito’s general definition of paramilitary, 
meaning “armed forces of the state that have both military capabilities and police 
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powers.”101 They go on to describe the three characteristics of a militarized or 
paramilitary police force used by Scobell and Hammitt: 
• deploy as units rather than as individuals 
• seek training from military personnel in the use of sophisticated 
weaponry, special apparel, and equipment 
• adopt a system of rank that replicates the structure of the military102 
Examples of true paramilitary police forces can be found in nations that 
employ the Napoleonic system of policing, such as France (Gendarmerie 
Nationale), Italy (Carabinieri), and Spain (Guardia Civil).103 It is significant that 
each of these police forces receives its authority from its respective ministries of 
defense, rather than a civilian entity, and act in support of the military during time 
of war.104 Based on these distinctions, the United States does not have true 
paramilitary police forces. Rather, what is seen in the United States are policing 
teams that employ some components of paramilitary policing. These teams are 
most commonly referred to as SWAT, emergency response teams (ERT), and 
special weapons groups (SPG). These specialized units differ from their 
Gendarmerie counterparts in that they remain under the command and control of 
their respective civilian police organizations. Another key difference is that 
members of these specialized units are often assigned on a part-time basis. 
According to one study, approximately 88 percent of SWAT team members 
perform this function as an “ancillary duty.”105 
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Tomas Weiss argues that the current debate about police militarization 
“lacks comprehensiveness and conceptual underpinning.”106 His contention is 
that no attempt has been made to define terms clearly. Rather, scholars have 
generally studied a particular component of the issue, such as equipment. This 
analysis can be seen in the June 2014 ACLU article entitled, “War Comes 
Home—The Excessive Militarization of American Policing,” which focused almost 
exclusively on equipment and SWAT teams without an attempt to define the term 
militarization.107  
Weiss makes a number of distinctions between the military and the police. 
He argues that while both the military and the police are authorized to use force, 
a distinctive factor is that the police “operate under the concept of minimal force, 
which means applying as little violence as necessary to maintain order”108 
Conversely, the military uses the “maximum force in order to defeat the power 
and will of the opponent as quickly as possible with minimum costs.”109 Using 
Weiss’s rationale, police militarization is not contingent upon the type of 
equipment or weapons the police used; rather, it is the manner in which they 
were used that would determine whether the police were militarized. 
E. MISCONCEPTIONS 
A thorough examination of the literature related to police militarization 
reveals an inclination to stigmatize the concept based on subjective measures. 
The lack of a clear definition has also resulted in the misapplication of the term. It 
is often used to describe any situation in which police behavior and/or policies 
are unpopular, such as the execution of no-knock search warrants, control of civil 
disturbances, application of force, and the gathering of intelligence.110 Police 
militarization has also been used synonymously to mean a form of police 
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misconduct despite the lack of any evidence to support such claims. For 
example, numerous recent incidents of questionable deadly force by the police 
have been attributed to police militarization despite any effort to correlate the two 
issues.111  
This confusion is understandable because the concept of militarization is 
not easy to apply to law enforcement. For example, Kraska’s definition of 
militarization, as found on page 23, may be accurate, but it becomes problematic 
when applied to policing because it fails to account for the fact that the police 
have always used force, or the threat of force, as a means to accomplish their 
mission.112 It also does not take into consideration the fact that force is used 
infrequently by U.S. law enforcement. According to a 2008 Bureau of Justice 
Statistics report, only 1.9 percent of law enforcement contacts with the public 
resulted in the use or threat of force by the police.113 This definition of 
militarization also fails to factor in law enforcement’s legitimate need to adjust the 
level of force available to police officers depending on the existing threat.114 
Weiss makes a key distinction that policing is actually based on the 
concept of minimal force, using only that force which is necessary to accomplish 
the objective (i.e., affect an arrest, control civil disorder, serve a warrant, etc.).115 
An increase in the amount of force used by law enforcement would not itself be 
indicative of militarization because force is an integral part of policing. Police 
militarization must therefore involve a change in the degree of force, as well as 
the manner in which it is applied. 
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F. DEFINITION  
Based on the nuanced criteria proposed in this chapter, a comprehensive 
definition of police militarization emerges. Police militarization is the adoption of 
military style equipment, tactics, and/or policies, which leverage force, or the 
threat of force as the primary means to achieve a law enforcement agency’s 
goals.  
The key distinction between this definition and others is that force must be 
used as an offensive measure. Using an armored personnel carrier, regardless of 
how or where it was procured, to provide protection for police officers during an 
armed conflict would not be considered a militarized police tactic because force 
was not projected. Using a SWAT team to perform a dynamic entry of a home to 
take a suspect into custody would be a militarized police tactic, even if no actual 
force was used. 
This definition can be applied systemically to a police agency. In other 
words, militarization could be the primary policing methodology for that 
organization. It can also be applied specifically. For example, certain police 
operations might be considered militarized depending on how they were 
conducted. Current active shooter response protocols would be considered a 
militarized police operation.  
This definition of police militarization does not necessarily indicate 
impropriety, although the potential for abuse certainly exists. It acknowledges 
that equipment obtained by the police (military and commercial) can be for the 
purpose of increasing officer safety, as well as projecting force. Police 
militarization is a result of the manner in which the equipment and tactics are 
employed. Each police agency must determine what level of militarization is 
appropriate based on numerous criteria, including the nature of the mission, 
degree of threat, expectations of the community, and the level of training. The 
adoption of militarization as a primary policing methodology could significantly 
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undermine community policing efforts, create citizen mistrust, and reduce the 
effectiveness of the police department.116 
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III. VIOLENT CRIME DATA 
On September 12, 2014, two Pennsylvania state troopers were attacked 
outside the Bloomington Grove (Pennsylvania) State Police Barracks. The 
suspect, Eric Frein, used a high power rifle to ambush the two troopers during a 
shift change. The attack took the life of Corporal Byron Dickson and severely 
wounded Trooper Alex Douglags. The subsequent search for Frein was a 
harrowing experience for law enforcement. The terrain of the vast search area 
was difficult and a known cop killer could potentially be hiding behind every tree. 
Frein was finally taken into custody after an exhaustive 48-day manhunt. Police 
found in his possession an AK-47 rifle, ammunition, and several pipe bombs.117  
This incident occurred just three months after another high profile ambush 
of police officers. On June 8, 2014, two Las Vegas police officers were shot and 
killed while they sat at a restaurant eating lunch. The investigation revealed that 
the suspects, Jared and Amanda Miller, had intentionally targeted police 
officers.118 The Miller’s appeared to have been caught up in a burgeoning anti-
government movement in which police officers are targeted because they are the 
most visible representation of an oppressive government.119 
These are examples of the types of violent attacks that law enforcement 
say justify their use of military weapons and tactics.120 Police officers are 
immersed in a culture of violence. They experience it both personally and 
vicariously. They see it on the news in their hometowns and across the nation. 
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Law enforcement officers are constantly reminded that they are targets of 
violence via officer safety bulletins, training seminars, and through media reports 
of shocking attacks, such as the Pennsylvania and Las Vegas incidents. The 
psychological effect such incidents have on law enforcement cannot be 
discounted. The fear of being attacked at any moment for no other reason than 
being a police officer has psychological and physiological ramifications.121  
Yet, these sensational incidents represent a fraction of the interactions the 
police have with the public on any given day. According to a 2011 Bureau of 
Justice Statistics report, 62.9 million citizens age 16 or older had at least one 
contact with law enforcement during the previous 12 months.122 Forty-nine 
percent of those contacts were labeled as either involuntary or initiated by the 
police. In other words, police officers engaged in over 30 million adversarial 
contacts with citizens in 2010. Despite the enormous number of citizen contacts 
with the police, the statistics on violent crime show that very few of these 
incidents involve violence.  
This chapter analyzes crime statistics in several categories in an attempt 
to quantify the level of violence in the United States, especially violence 
encountered by police officers. This analysis is important because critics and 
supporters of police militarization use selected statistics to bolster their 
arguments. For example, critics often argue that violent crime, particularly 
against police officers, has actually decreased, and therefore, negated the need 
for militarization. In an article that appeared in the Washington Post, one such 
critic, Radley Balko, stated: 
According to FBI statistics, 27 police officers were feloniously killed 
in 2013, the lowest raw number in more than 50 years. (The 
previous low was 41 in 2008.) If we go by officer homicides as a 
percentage of active-duty police, it was probably the safest year in 
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a century. The number of cops killed on duty has been falling since 
the mid-1990s, consistent with the overall drop in violent crime in 
America. Assaults against police officers have been in decline as 
well.123 
Using such an isolated statistic as commentary on the level of violence 
law enforcement faces is somewhat misleading. For instance, it is true that the 
number of police officers killed in the line of duty has decreased, but those 
statistics fail to consider advances in body armor and tactics, which have 
prevented the deaths of numerous officers. According to a report by the National 
Institute of Justice, body armor is credited with saving the lives of over 3,000 
police officers during the last three decades.124 Without the protection of body 
armor, an additional 100 police officer would have been killed each year making 
that era one of the deadliest for police. Statistics like those cited by Balko 
neglects many other measures of violence, which are no less indicative of the 
dangers of policing.  
The remainder of this chapter is an analysis of available national data on 
various categories of violent crime designed to determine the actual magnitude of 
violence law enforcement officer’s encounter. These categories include felonious 
killing of police officers, assaults on police officers, and national violent crime 
data. This analysis also accounts for emerging trends that have an impact on 
police militarization.  
A. LAW ENFORCEMENT KILLED IN THE LINE OF DUTY 
More than any other data, statistics about police line of duty deaths 
(LODD) affirm the dangers inherent in law enforcement. However, not all LODDs 
are the result of violence. Of the 126 LODDs in 2014, approximately half were 
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the result of traffic incidents or job related illness and accidents.125 LODDs 
resulting from felonious acts were the cause of the remaining half.126 News of 
such tragedies quickly reverberates through the law enforcement community via 
a variety of channels, such as inter-agency communications and 
social/mainstream media. The more tragic the incident, the more national 
coverage the story receives. With the advent of in-car video, body cameras, and 
the proliferation of mobile video cameras, these stories often involve images, 
which fill the news cycle for days after a LODD. While these stories and images 
frame the narrative of violence that police officers often adopt, the data shows 
that these tragedies are infrequent.127  
According to the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, a 
police officer is killed in the line of duty every 60 hours.128 Since the first 
recorded LODD in 1791, over 20,000 police officers have been killed.129 While 
seeming to be a high number, by comparison, 3.5 people die in automobile 
crashes every hour.130  
The number of LODDs  significantly varies from year to year, as seen in 
Figure 3, which depicts the total number of LODDs  from 1914–2014.131  
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From “Officer Deaths by Year,” accessed April 8, 2015, http://www.nleomf. 
org/facts/officer-fatalities-data/year.html. 
This data set includes both felonious and non-felonious incidents (e.g., 
traffic incidents, job related illness/accidents, etc.). Despite the fact that the data 
do not show significant fluctuations in the statistics, the total number of LODDs 
resulting from all causes have been steadily declining since the high in 1974. The 
deadliest year was actually 1930 when 301 officers were killed.132  
The following analysis examines LODDs that resulted from felonious acts 
from 1987–2014. Those years were chosen because they correspond with the 
modern era of police militarization, which began in the 1980s during the “war on 
drugs.”133 The primary source for this data is the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports —
Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA). The data were 
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organized by decade to coincide with the way in which the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) published the data. It should be noted that some of the data 
do overlap.  
1. Decade 1 Data (1987–1996)134 
• average number of felonious LODDs  during this time period: (69.6) 
• the year with the highest number of deaths was 1994: (79) 
• the year with the fewest number of deaths was 1996: (55) 
• leading cause of death—Firearms 
2. Decade 2 Data (1996–2005)135  
• average number of felonious LODDs  for this time period: (57.5) 
• the years with the highest number of deaths were 1997 and 2001: 
(70) 
• the year with the fewest number of deaths was 1999: (42) 
• leading cause of death—Firearms 
3. Decade 3 Data (2004–2013)136  
• the average number of felonious LODDs  for this time period: (51)  
• the year with the highest number of deaths was 2011: (72) 
• the year with the fewest number of deaths was 2013: (27) 
• leading cause of death—Firearms 
According to preliminary data for 2014, 126 police officers were killed in 
the line of duty.137 This number was a 24 percent increase from 2013. Of those 
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killed, 62 were the result of felonious incidents, while 50 were firearms related. 
This number was a significant increase from 2013. It is too early to determine 
whether the increases seen in 2014 are indicative of a reversal of the downward 
trend in LODDs due to felonious actions seen in the previous three decades. See 
Figure 4. 





















After “UCR Publications,” accessed May 20, 2015, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/ 
cjis/ucr/ucr-publications.  
One of the factors that accounts for some of the increase in LODDs in 
2014 was the significant increase in ambush attacks. This type of attack jumped 
from five incidents in 2013 to 15 incidents in 2014.138 These types of attacks are 
the most concerning to police officers because they are so difficult to prevent.   
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Another area of concern is firearms. Firearms have historically been the 
proximate cause of the vast majority of LODDs from felonious action. As seen in 
Figure 5, firearms accounted for an average of 92 percent of the felonious LODD 
fatalities. This number is not surprising since the United States has the highest 
rate of gun ownership in the world. It is estimated that there are approximately 90 
guns for every 100 people in the United States.139 It is also worth noting that 
firearms related fatalities jumped 56 percent from 2013 to 2014. Handguns 
remain the weapon most often used. From 2004 to 2013, handguns accounted 
for 67.5 percent of LODDs from felonious action. Rifles accounted for 17 
percent.140  
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cjis/ucr/ucr-publications.  
                                            
139 “Highlight: Research Note 9: Estimating Civilian Owned Firearms,” accessed April 9, 
2015, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/about-us/highlights/highlight-research-note-9-estimating-
civilian-owned-firearms.html. 
140 “2013 LEOKA Home.” 
 41 
In summary, LODDs due to felonious action have fluctuated greatly during 
the last 100 years. The last three decades have experienced an overall 
downward trend, perhaps the result of the increased use and effectiveness of 
body armor.141 Firearms continue to be the leading cause of felonious LODDs. 
Firearms incidents and ambush attacks both experienced sharp increases in 
2014. While it is difficult to say that a new trend is emerging based on the 2014 
data, it is nevertheless concerning. 
B. ASSAULTS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Another important measure of the level of violence police officers face is 
the number of assaults on law enforcement. Again, the data is divided into three 
consecutive decades.  
• Decade 1 (1987–1996)142 
• the average number of assaults on police officers: (63,409.2) 
• Decade 2 (1994–2004)143 
• the average number of assaults dropped: (56,694.8)  
• Decade 3 (2004–2013)144  
• the average number of assaults increased: (57,344.6) 
Despite the slight increase for the decade, assaults have been declining 
since 2009. See Figure 6. 
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cjis/ucr/ucr-publications.  
It should be noted that the total number of police officers in the United 
States during these three decades also increased from about 570,000 in 1986145 
to about 765,000 in 2008.146 To account for this variable, the assault rate on 
police officers was also factored into the analysis. Overall, the assault rate on 
police officers (calculated as the number of assaults per 100 officers) has 
steadily declined since 2004.147 In 2004, the assault rate was 11.9. By 2013, the 
assault rate had dropped to 9.3. See Figure 7. However, the injury rate during 
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that time period has steadily been increasing from a low in 2007 of 25.9 percent 
to a high in 2013 of 29.2 percent. This number could indicate that the types of 
assaults have become more violent. The number of assaults with all types of 
weapons (firearms, cutting instruments, other dangerous weapons, and personal 
weapons) has also been increasing from 2004 to 2013.148  
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Despite the downward trend in assaults on police officers, the numbers 
remain high. For example, the total number of assaults on police officers in 2004 
was 59,373.149 In 2013, that number had fallen 49,851. While encouraging, the 
fact remains that more than nine out of every 100 police officers in the United 
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States was the victim of an assault in 2013.150 However, an important variable is 
missing in this brief analysis. Law enforcement officers are trained and often able 
to diffuse volatile situations, and prevent or minimize violence outcomes.151 
When trying to understand how police view the dangers of policing, the number 
of police/citizen contacts that were potentially violent must be considered in 
addition to those that resulted in violence. These encounters also have a 
profound psychological effect on police officers, one that is difficult to quantify, 
but no less important. 
C. VIOLENT CRIME RATES 
Attacks directed against law enforcement are not the only types of 
violence police officers encounter. Police officers are routinely required to 
investigate violent crimes. Responding to these violent incidents, especially those 
involving domestic violence, can be extremely dangerous.152  
It is, therefore, valuable to analyze violent crime trends for a similar time 
period to determine accurately the total level of violence to which police officers 
are exposed. For statistical purposes, the FBI defines violent crime as those 
offenses that involve force or threat of force, and include murder and non-
negligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.153 Based on 
data obtained from the FBI, 1,483,999 reported violent crimes occurred in the 
United States in 1987. Violent crime rates climbed steadily to a peak of 
1,932,274 in 1992 before starting a downward trend. Violent crime rates 
generally decreased from 1994 to 1999.154 The rates then remained relatively 
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unchanged until 2007. Since 2009, violent crime rates have dropped 12.3 
percent.155 See Figure 8. 
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D. SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA 
While these statistical reductions in crime seem significant, interpreting the 
data accurately can be rather challenging. One concern is that these crime 
statistics are only a measure of those crimes actually reported to a law 
enforcement agency. The frequency and likelihood that people report crimes are 
affected by a variety of factors. Research by Wesley Skogan found, “In every 
jurisdiction there is a great deal of unreported crime-even in the most “civil” 
                                            




places, where cooperation with the police is presumed to be high-and 
everywhere the decision to report seems to be determined by a rational calculus 
regarding the cost and benefit of such action.”156 Unfortunately, crime is 
substantially underreported in many of the most vulnerable neighborhoods due to 
a mistrust of the police. This mistrust can create difficulty for the police as they 
attempt to address the violent crime problem. Skogan went on to state, “If the 
poor, racial minorities and those who feel systemically mistreated by the police 
are less willing to report their experiences, all of the consequences of 
nonreporting also will accrue to their disadvantage.”157  
Data from the Bureau of Justice Services (BJS) seems to support the 
notion that a significant amount of violent crime goes unreported. Since 1973, the 
BJS has conducted the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). Meant to 
compliment Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) data, the NCVS uses surveys to 
capture data on unreported crimes.158 According to NCVS data for 2013, the 
violent crime rate was 23.2 per 1,000.159 The actual reported violent crime rate 
based on FBI UCR data in 2013 was 3.67 per 1,000.160 Even considering the 
marginal errors inherent in survey data, the discrepancy in these values indicates 
a large number of violent crimes may go unreported. The NCVS data also 
portrays a different trend than the UCR data. In 2004, NCVS data reported the 
violent crime rate at 21 per 1,000.161 By 2013, this rate had risen to 23.2, which 
indicated that violent crime had actually increased during this time period. 
However, the FBI UCR data reported a violent crime rate of 4.65 per 1,000 in 
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2004, which signified a reduction in violent crime.162 The data also indicates that 
the number of unreported violent crimes may be increasing. 
Many crimes go unreported for a number of reasons. One of the growing 
reasons may be related to the burgeoning immigrant population. Research 
suggests that certain minority groups are often less likely to report crime to the 
police. Robert Davis and Nicole Henderson explore the relationship between 
police and minority communities in an article entitled, “Willingness to Report 
Crimes: The Role of Ethnic Group Membership and Community Efficacy.” In this 
article, they discuss the inherent distrust many minority groups have of police 
and how it affects their likelihood to report crimes. Many of the people from these 
immigrant communities “come to this country with a strong distrust of authority 
and without an understanding about the role of police in a democratic society.”163  
In 2013, nearly a million people were granted permanent legal residence 
in the United States.164 The top country of origin was Mexico (14 percent). That 
same year, almost 800,000 people became naturalized citizens.165 The top 
country of origin was Mexico (12.7 percent). In 2012, it was estimated that 11.4 
million unauthorized immigrants were living in the United States. The top country 
of origin was Mexico (59 percent).166 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 
2010, 50.5 million Hispanics were living in the United States, approximately 16 
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percent of the total population.167 National surveys indicate that the Hispanic 
community harbors considerable feelings of distrust for law enforcement.168 This 
distrust could mean that a significant portion of the population is apprehensive to 
report crimes to the police. As relations between the police and other segments 
of the population erode, similar reductions in crime reporting could be expected, 
which makes crime data even more unreliable.  
Another significant problem with the statistics on violent crime is that they 
are not representative. Each jurisdiction and every police department faces its 
own unique challenges when it comes to violent crime and threats to police 
officers. According to an article by the Police Executive Research Forum entitled, 
“Violent Crime in America “A Tale of Two Cities,” crime rates have become 
unstable. Despite national decreases in violent crime during the 1990s and 
2000s, pockets of the country experienced significant increases:  
In 2005 and 2006, violent crime levels nationwide increased, and 
some cities experienced double digit or even triple-digit percentage 
increases in homicides and other violence. In some jurisdictions, 
the changes were startling: For example, Boston experienced a 10-
year high in its number of homicides. In Cincinnati, the number of 
homicides was the highest in 20 years. Orlando, Fla. and Prince 
George’s County, Md. experienced all-time highs in murders.169 
Therefore, it is only marginally useful to consider national aggregate data when 
determining the level of violence experienced by police officers. 
E. AMBUSH ATTACKS 
Ambush attacks are of particular concern to law enforcement. According 
to the preliminary 2014 National Law Enforcement Officer Fatality Report, 15 
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officers were killed in ambush style attacks. This number was a significant 
increase from 2013 in which five officers were killed in ambush attacks. Speaking 
about this trend, Attorney General Eric Holder stated, "These troubling statistics 
underscore the very real dangers that America's brave law enforcement officers 
face every time they put on their uniforms."170  
Overall, the statistics indicate a decline in the total number of ambush 
attacks on U.S. law enforcement between 1990 and 2012. The highest number of 
ambush attacks against law enforcement in the last 25 years occurred in 1991. 
The total number of ambush attacks remained fairly consistent from 1995 to 
2012. See Figure 9. 
Figure 9. Ambushes on U.S. Law Enforcement  
 
From “IACP Ambush Fact Sheet,” accessed May 12, 2015, http://www. 
theiacp.org/Portals/0/documents/pdfs/Ambush_Project/IACP_Ambush_Fact_She
et.pdf. 
However, an increasing number of law enforcement homicides have been 
classified as ambush attacks. From 1990 to 2000, 12 percent of police homicides 
were attributed to ambush attacks. From 2001 to 2012, the percentage jumped to 
21 percent.171 The total number of law enforcement deaths from ambush attacks 
has trended up since 1990. After a 30-year low of five deaths in 2013, the 
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number of ambush deaths of police officers significantly jumped in 2014. Of the 
50 firearms related deaths in 2014, 15 were classified as ambush attacks.172 See 
Figure 10. 
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Many experts agree that ambush attacks represent one of the biggest 
threats to police officers because they are so hard to combat. According to the 
IACP, an ambush attack is comprised of four elements: 
• element of surprise 
• concealment of the assailants, their intentions, or weapon 
• suddenness of the attack 
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• a lack of provocation173 
These elements make it extremely difficult for officers to recognize they are in 
potential danger and protect themselves. Also, the uncertainty involved in 
ambush attacks has the potential to cause great psychological harm to police 
officers.174  
F. ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS 
Another disturbing trend and one that presents a unique problem for law 
enforcement is the proliferation of active shooter incidents. The FBI defines an 
active shooter as someone who “is actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill 
people in a confined and populated area.”175 The use of a firearm is implied in 
the definition. According to the FBI, between 2000 and 2013, there have been at 
least 160 incidents nationwide that qualify as an active shooter event. These 
documented incidents have resulted in the deaths of 486 people and an 
additional 557 wounded. On average, 11.4 incidents occur annually.176 The 
following list shows the incidents with the highest casualty counts: 
• Cinemark Century 16 Theater in Aurora, Colorado 
• (12 killed, 58 wounded), July 20, 2012 
• Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in Blacksburg, 
Virginia 
• (32 killed, 17 wounded), April 16, 2007 
• Ft. Hood Soldier Readiness Processing Center in Ft. Hood, Texas 
• (13 killed, 32 wounded), November 5, 2009 
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• Sandy Hook Elementary School and a residence in Newtown, 
Connecticut 
• (27 killed, 2 wounded), December 14, 2012 
Unfortunately, while many other forms of violent crime have been 
declining for the last 10 years, active shooter incidents have been on the 
increase. As shown in Figure 11, the FBI determined that between 2000 and 
2013, the average number of active shooter incidents per year increased from 
6.4 to 16.4.177  
Figure 11. Average Number of Active Shooter Incidents Per Year 
between 2000 and 2013 
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These incidents have had a profound impact on law enforcement. For 
example, the April 20, 1999 mass shooting at Columbine High School in 
Colorado changed forever how law enforcement responds to such incidents. 
Prior to Columbine, the standard protocol for such situations was to secure the 
perimeter, contain the threat, and wait for a SWAT team. Unfortunately, 12 
students and a teacher were killed during the 45 minutes it took the SWAT team 
to respond and intervene during the Columbine incident.178  
Following Columbine, law enforcement developed rapid response 
protocols that involve police officers immediately entering facilities in which an 
active shooting is taking place in an attempt to neutralize the threat as quickly as 
possible. Although this type of police response is necessary to save lives, it is 
also very dangerous. In the 45 documented active shooter incidents in which law 
enforcement arrived in time to intercede, police officers suffered casualties in 
46.7 percent of the incidents, including nine deaths.179 Even with the rapid 
response protocols in place, 40.6 percent of the incidents ended prior to the 
arrival of law enforcement. The majority of the incidents (69 percent) ended in 
five minutes or less, while half ended in less than two minutes.180  
Although these incidents are rare, police officers nationwide are being 
trained in rapid response protocols. This training places the burden to intervene 
during these dangerous situations on everyday police officers, not highly trained 
and equipped SWAT members. Current response protocols include the 
application of deadly force as a primary means to save lives.181 This use of force 
has led many police departments to equip officers with some sort of military style 
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weapon, usually a rifle, to respond to these incidents effectively.182 These 
weapons are more effective at stopping violent offenders because of their high 
muzzle velocities and can be fired much more accurately under stress.183 
G. SUMMARY 
This analysis has proven there to be minimal value in aggregate national 
data on violence. National trends are not representative. Many places in the 
United States are experiencing unprecedented levels of violence despite 
decreasing violence nationally.184 Also, because the data only reflects reported 
crime, it fails to accurately capture the true threat of violence in a community. The 
perceived threat, experienced by both the public and the police, is an important 
factor when determining the level of response necessary to deal with violence in 
a community.  
Law enforcement must also be prepared to deal with other types of 
violence that were beyond the scope of this analysis but are equally as important. 
These types of violence include threats from terrorism and homegrown violent 
extremism (HGVE). Of particular concern are lone wolf attacks that accounted for 
74 percent of the documented domestic terrorism cases from April 1, 2009 to 
February 1, 2015.185 Burton and Stewart define a lone wolf as “a person who 
acts on his or her own without orders from—or even connections to—an 
organization.”186 Although instances of both lone wolf and HGVE attacks are 
rare, law enforcement must be prepared to deal with them.  
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A final consideration when examining violence in the United States is the 
prevalence of firearms. As stated previously, the United States has the highest 
rate of gun ownership in the world (.90 guns per capita).187 Law enforcement 
must continually contend with this fact as they perform their duties. Law 
enforcement officials often cite the sheer number of weapons and types of 
weapons available to the public as the reason they have accumulated high-
powered weapons of their own.188 The police found themselves woefully ill 
equipped during numerous violent incidents to handle them effectively. Several of 
the most impactful incidents were the subject of an article that appeared in Police 
Magazine entitled, “5 Gunfights that Changed Law Enforcement.”189 The 
conclusion of the article is that the police cannot rely on SWAT teams to 
intervene in every dangerous situation. Similar to the response protocols for 
active shooter incidents, all police officers must be trained and equipped to deal 
with a myriad of situations including low probability—high consequence events. 
One of the challenges facing police leaders and at the heart of the police 
militarization debate is balancing the ability to mitigate these types of events, 
while maintaining traditional-community-based policing methods.  
One fact cannot be argued. Violence in the United States exists and the 
police are charged with mitigating it. In doing so, the police themselves have 
increasingly become targets. The collective psychological consequence of this 
reality is the subject of the next chapter.  
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IV. LAW ENFORCEMENT’S SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED 
REALITY OF VIOLENCE 
The previous chapter was a statistical analysis designed to quantify the 
current level of reported violence affecting law enforcement. It is an important 
analysis related to the topic of police militarization since much of modern policing 
is driven by data.190 The analysis indicates that violence has generally 
decreased during the last three decades. The number of law enforcement 
officers killed and/or assaulted in the line of duty appears to be trending down.191 
Reported incidents of violent crime are also dropping.192 The number of ambush 
attacks has leveled after a significant drop in the early 1990s.193 It is too early to 
tell if the recent spike in ambush attacks is indicative of a trend. The only 
category of violence experiencing an increase is active shooter incidents, yet 
these incidents are still extremely rare events.194  
Despite these trends, many in the law enforcement community have 
justified police militarization as a necessary response to an increasingly 
dangerous and violent society.195 If a direct (inverse) correlation exists between 
police militarization and violence, a corresponding decrease should have 
occurred in militarization commensurate with the decrease in violence during the 
last three decades. However, the literature on the subject indicates that the level 
of police militarization has actually increased during that time period.196 Experts 
                                            
190 “Data-Driven Approaches to Crime and Traffic Safety,” National Institute of Justice, 
accessed June 7, 2015, http://nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/operations/traffic/Pages/ddacts. 
aspx. 
191 “Officer Deaths by Year.” 
192 “Crime In The United States—Table 1,” accessed April 19, 2015, http://www.fbi.gov/about 
-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/1tabledatadecoverviewpdf/table_ 
1_crime_in_the_united_states_by_volume_and_rate_per_100000_inhabitants_1994-2013.xls. 
193 “IACP Ambush Fact Sheet.” 
194 Blair and Schweit, “A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000–2013.” 
195 “The Justified ‘Militarization’ of America’s Police.” 
196 Radley Balko, Overkill: The Rise in Paramilitary Police Raids in America (Washington, 
DC: Cato Institute, 2006). 
 58 
point to the war on drugs in the 1980s, the war on crime in the 1990s, and the 
war on terror in the 2000s as the impetus for much of the modern increases in 
militarization.197 Another potential indication of increased militarization is the fact 
that the federal government has transferred $2.75 billion dollars’ worth of excess 
military equipment to law enforcement agencies in just the last five years.198 
A number of potential explanations for this apparent contradiction are 
possible, many of which are beyond the scope of this analysis. This chapter 
addresses the psychosocial reasons why the statistics on violence have little 
impact on how law enforcement perceives the threat of violence or the tactics 
they employ to mitigate that threat. The following analysis posits that law 
enforcement’s perceptions of violence are strongly influenced by their social 
identity. This socialized emersion in violence results in a constructed reality of the 
threats they face, which is reinforced through training and the media.  
A. SOCIAL IDENTITY 
One of the factors that dictate how individuals, including police officers, 
perceive and interact in the world is their identity. Identity is simply how people 
see themselves in relation to others.199 Numerous factors work in concert to form 
people’s identity, but psychologists agree that it is primarily a social process. 
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman state, “Identity is formed by social 
processes. Once crystallized, it is maintained, modified, or even reshaped by the 
social relations.”200 According to Henri Tajfel, social identity is “that part of an 
individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in 
a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance 
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attached to that membership.”201 Therefore, people’s identities are formed 
through their engagement with others and can change over time as they interact 
with the social environment. 
A key factor in determining the strength of a group’s social identity is the 
process of social categorization.202 This process is rooted in a group’s natural 
desire to create a separate and distinct identity. Fathali Moghaddan writes, “At 
the foundation of intergroup relations is the basic process of categorizing the 
world and identifying individuals as belonging to different groups. By changing 
how the social world is categorized, we could alter group membership and 
intergroup relations.”203 In other words, even though many groups are composed 
of dissimilar individuals (i.e., ethnicity, culture, race, etc.) the group tends to 
minimize those differences in favor of the group’s identity. Interestingly, the 
opposite happens to the perception of those outside the group. Moghaddan 
writes, “Similarly, people come to see themselves as members of groups that are 
in fundamental respects different from other groups, but actually in many cases 
the intergroup differences are minor. This narcissism of minor differences 
involves the construction of differences even when objectively there are none.”204 
Specifically, members of the in-group exaggerate differences in those outside of 
the group identity (out-group).  
The categorization process is particularly pronounced in law enforcement 
and serves to make the group identity very strong. Police officers often separate 
the social environment into two distinct categories, police and everyone else.205 
In an article entitled, “From Here On Out, We’re All Blue; Interaction Order, 
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Social Infrastructure, and Race in Police Socialization,” Norman Conti and 
Patrick Doreian discuss the effect of the socialization process in law 
enforcement. They write, “This socialization process also generates an intense 
sense of loyalty to the occupational group along with animosity towards civilians 
and administrators.”206 
Evidence suggests that the socialized group identity and categorization 
process also begins to form the basis for an individual’s perception of the world. 
Miles Hewstone and Jos M. F. Jaspars write, “For Man ‘knows’ the world, not 
simply in terms of interpersonal encounters, but also in terms of the changing 
relations of large-scale social categories. These social groupings are 
fundamental to our social identity and to the social reality that we actively 
cognize.”207 Referring to how Americans perceive violence in a social context, 
Henry Brownstein writes: 
Violence has been socially constructed in the Unites states in 
response to various claims made about what violence is, where it is 
found, who is affected by it, and so on. Those claims have been 
made by a wide variety of claims makers—not only people we know 
personally or the mass media—within various sociological and 
political contexts to give meaning to particular acts, action, or 
activity as violent.208 
These socialized categories can also be a strong influence on how 
members of the group behave. John Turner writes, “a social group can be 
usefully conceptualized as a number of individuals who have internalized the 
same social category membership as a component of their self-concept…group 
behavior can be seen as casually dependent on the functioning of such shared 
social identifications.”209 As the group achieves distinctiveness, the group’s 
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behavior is strongly affected by the group’s new identity, which is determined by 
“its member’s understanding of themselves and their group.”210  
A number of factors affect the degree of influence that social identity has 
on the group. A particularly strong influence on group identification is having a 
set of shared experiences. Since the law enforcement community is large 
(according to BJS, in 2008, there were approximately 765,000 sworn police 
officers)211, it has a huge inventory of collective experiences that help define their 
identity. However, the type of experience is more important than the number of 
experiences. Moghaddam emphasizes that the emotional aspect of shared 
experiences makes the group bond so powerful.212 He goes on to suggest that 
social identity strongly influences how people think and interact with others and is 
significantly impacted by experiences and emotions related to the group.213 
Police officers tend to have a powerful emotional connection to the in-group due 
in part to those shared experiences.214 It helps explain the strong social identity 
observed in the law enforcement community.  
It is also important to understand the implication of those shared in-group 
experiences. Violent incidents have a pervasive effect on law enforcement. 
Anytime a police officer is killed, especially when it is the result of intentional 
violence, the psychological effects are experienced in every police department in 
the country. For example, New York Police Department (NYPD) Officer Brian 
Moore died on May 4, 2015, after being shot by a suspect two days earlier. Tens 
of thousands of police officers from around the country gathered in New York 
City to honor him during the funeral.215 The attack on Officer Moore was not 
                                            
210 Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, A Practitioner’s Way Forward, 61. 
211 Reaves, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008.  
212 Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations, 90. 
213 Ibid. 
214 John M. Violanti, “Police Psychological Trauma,” Problems, Issues, and Challenges in 
Law Enforcement, accessed May 12, 2015, http://spiritofthelaw.org/sol1art12.html. 
215 Ray Sanchez, “Funeral to Pay Tribute to NYPD Officer Brian Moore,” CNN, May 8, 2015, 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/08/us/new-york-police-officer-funeral/index.html. 
 62 
seen as an isolated incident, but rather a negative honor challenge directed at 
the entire in-group that demanded some sort of a response.216 The massive 
gathering at Officer Moore’s funeral by police officers from all over the country, 
most of whom did not know him personally, was a show of solidarity for the in-
group. The accumulation of these incidents by the in-group adds to the collective 
sense of threat and feeling of isolation.217  
The perceived threat of a ubiquitous enemy is another significant factor 
that determines the degree of influence of law enforcement’s social identity. 
Moghaddam writes, “The identification of an external target as a threat (e.g., to 
an army or church) channels negative energies toward an enemy outside and 
binds group members more tightly together inside.”218 For police officers, the 
enemy is not easy to identify. Certainly, those who have engaged in acts of 
violence might be considered the enemy. Nevertheless, police officers must also 
guard against those who may someday engage in violence. Even when dealing 
with subjects familiar to the police or those who have no criminal or violent 
history, the threat of an incident escalating into violence is present. Adding to the 
uncertainty is the fact that law enforcement frequently interact with individuals 
with mental illness.219 Some studies indicate that 7 percent of all police contacts 
with the public involve someone with a form of mental illness.220 These incidents 
can become violent without warning or provocation. Police officers must live with 
the reality that each call for service could become violent so they are prepared 
when it happens. 
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This uncertainty can drive police officers to view much of the public as a 
potential enemy.221 Breckenridge and Zimbardo state, “Under conditions of 
uncertainty, emotionally evocative events are more easily imagined and more 
readily available for cognitive processing.”222 Police officers deal with high 
degrees of uncertainty on a daily basis, as each call for service could potentially 
turn violent. Sustained levels of uncertainty result in high levels of stress and 
anxiety.223 This high degree of frequent uncertainty adds to the socially 
constructed view of violence that police officers share. 
Another important factor in forming a strong social identity is the inherent 
desire to belong to groups with a “positive and distinct identity.”224 This desire 
has become increasingly problematic for the police. Police officers often have a 
negatively skewed view of their status in society. In an article that appeared in 
Police Chief Magazine, the authors stated,  
This negative way the law enforcement community believes the 
public perceives it is reinforced not only by the public and the media 
but often by senior officers as well: at police academies, at the 
station, in training, and in the lunch room. Biased media coverage 
only confirms what they already “knew” from years of police work 
and shared stories in the squad room.225  
This perception furthers the divide between the police and the public even though 
the reality may be quite different. A national study conducted by Montana State 
University in 2006 found 85.3 percent of the survey respondents were supportive 
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of the law enforcement community.226 The survey concluded that the police often 
feel the opposite is true because police officers have much more interaction with 
the 10 percent of the population that is not supportive.227 The study concluded, 
“Officers are judging the people that make up their day-to-day work world not 
based on an objective view of reality but rather based on powerful 
misperceptions that bias their attitudes and behavior.”228 
However, law enforcement’s perception about public opinion is not 
completely unsubstantiated. Research shows dramatic differences arise when 
race and class profiles are considered. Ronald Weitzer discovered vastly 
divergent views of the police depending on which neighborhood was polled.229 
Therefore, law enforcement’s perception of being at odds with the public is not 
without basis. It is also nothing new. The following excerpt from an article written 
by William Westley appeared in the American Journal of Sociology in 1953: 
The policeman finds his most pressing problems in his relationships 
to the public. His is a service occupation but of an incongruous 
kind, since he must discipline those whom he serves. He is 
regarded as corrupt and inefficient by, and meets with hostility and 
criticism from, the public. He regards the public as his enemy, feels 
his occupational [responsibilities] to be in conflict with the 
community, and regards himself to be a pariah.230 
Whether these feelings are justified is somewhat inconsequential. The 
existence of these emotionally charged perceptions of the public contributes to 
the social categorization process. Brannan et al. state, “Because our group 
membership become parts of our identity, any value associated with those 
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groups will have implications for our feelings of self-worth.”231 Law enforcement, 
in their attempt to define themselves in a distinct and positive manner, creates an 
identity that can further distance themselves from the public.232 Joan Barker 
captured the essence of this concept in the following excerpt from a book 
entitled, Danger, Duty, and Disillusion: The Worldview of Los Angeles Police 
Officers: 
Police officers are consciously aware of their role as active 
participants in the creation and interpretation of this social world. 
They are aware of the perceived necessity for adherence to their 
construction of reality in order to perform their job. They believe that 
the ordering of reality is essential for social survival and also for 
literal survival. Adherence to the police version of the world confers 
actual, literal, survival in the performance of a job that has 
extraordinary risks and deals with high levels of uncertainty and 
danger.233 
Beyond the development of a strong social identity, a few key 
psychological concepts are also important to understanding why police officers 
perceive violence differently. The first concept is known as the availability 
heuristic. Daniel Kahneman defines the availability heuristic as “the process of 
judging frequency by the ease with which instances come to mind.”234 Since 
police officers are exposed to violence at a much higher rate than the public, both 
personally and vicariously, they are able to recall violent encounters much more 
easily, which can make the world seem more violent than it is.  
A second key concept that affects law enforcement’s perceptions of 
violence is known as the negativity bias. According to Kahneman, evolution has 
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enabled the human brain to give priority to bad news as a survival 
mechanism.235 
James Breckenridge and Phillip Zimbardo state, “The negativity bias 
impacts a wide range of psychological processes, including attention, memory, 
decision-making and impression formation. Negativity works in concert with a set 
of heuristics, mental shortcuts, that most of us use to predict risk and make 
decisions under uncertainty.”236 
This concept was the subject of an article entitled, “Bad is Stronger than 
Good.” In it, the authors write, “Bad emotions, bad parents, and bad feedback 
have more impact than good ones, and bad information is processed more 
thoroughly than good.”237 Others have also found that negative information tends 
to be perceived as more influential than positive data, even when positive and 
negative data are both presented together equally.238 Police officers are 
bombarded with bad news and much of that news has to do with violence.239 The 
concept of negativity bias helps to explain why police officers often react strongly 
to violent and potentially violent situations.240  
Finally, the concept of representativeness is important to this discussion. It 
has already been shown that statistics about violence do not necessarily reflect 
how people view violence. One explanation for this phenomenon is known as the 
representative heuristic; estimating the probability of an event occurring by 
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comparing it to a cognitive prototype rather than a base rate.241 This concept can 
be seen in the results of a recent Pew study. According to the study, 56 percent 
of Americans believe gun violence is worse now than it was 20 years ago despite 
actual data that it is 49 percent lower.242 Their research concluded that high 
profile incidents of gun violence become ingrained in the public’s psyche. These 
images are easily retrieved when questioned about gun violence and form the 
basis of their estimations.243 According to Kahneman, the representative 
heuristic results in “an excessive willingness to predict the occurrence of unlikely 
(low base-rate) events.”244 Since police officers experience violence at a much 
higher rate than the public, and because it is easy for police officers to recall an 
instance of violence, they are predisposed to misinterpret the level of violence to 
which they are actually exposed.245 This misinterpretation can result in a 
condition called hypervigilance, a feeling of constantly being targeted or 
threatened.246 Hypervigilance can cause aggressive behavior during traffic stops 
and contact with the public. It can also lead to overreaction to seemingly 
innocuous situations.247  
Unlike other social groups that also experience aspects of violence, such 
as doctors and rescue workers, law enforcement’s direct contact with the 
perpetration of violence is what influences their perceptions of and response to 
violence. This innate ability to categorize situations rapidly based on previous 
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experience and make almost instantaneous decisions is known as naturalistic 
decision making.248  This process helps police officers survive violent incidents 
but can also cause over-reaction. 
B. TRAINING 
Training is an important factor both in relation to the general discussion of 
police militarization and in terms of perspectives on violence. Police training, 
especially paramilitary style police training, is not only designed to teach 
individuals how to perform the job’s duties, it is also meant create a new identity 
separate and distinct from their prior civilian identity.249 This process is also 
known as social creativity. Brannan et al. state that social creativity is “largely a 
matter of inculcating and indoctrinating group members with a new sense of 
themselves and their group purpose.”250 Police instructors instill an 
institutionalized vision of the profession in new officers that often results in 
“changes in perspective, personality, and identity.”251 This process is reinforced 
through an “idealized sense of police character…transmitted through 
extracurricular presentations of obedience to authority in paramilitary dress, 
demeanor, and deportment, as well as in the subtext of war stories or parables 
told by instructors, veteran officers, and peers.”252  
New police officers spend an inordinate amount of time during basic 
training dealing with violence. According to an article by Allison Chappell, 
“Recruits spend 90 percent of their training time on firearms, driving, first aid, 
self-defense and other use-of-force tactics even though only 10 percent of their 
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job duties will put them in positions where they need to use these skills.”253 This 
data is relatively consistent with other sources of national data. In 2006, the BJS 
produced a special report entitled, State and Local Law Enforcement Training 
Academies, 2006. According to their data, significantly more time was spent on 
force training (i.e., self-defense, firearms, non-lethal weapons) than de-escalation 
training (i.e., mediation/conflict management). Overall, the survey found that 
force training accounted for 123 hours while eight hours was dedicated to de-
escalation methods.254 See Table 1. 
Table 1.   Topics Included in Basic Training of State and Local Law 
Enforcement Training Academics, 2006 
 
From Brian A. Reaves, “State and Local Law Enforcement Training Academies, 
2006” (Bureau of Justice Statistics, February 2009), 6, http://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/slleta06.pdf. 
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To validate the amount of force training being conducted during basic 
police training further, requests were sent to all state law enforcement academies 
in the United States and all regional/independent police academies in Virginia to 
provide copies of their basic training curricula. Responses were received from 
eight state law enforcement agencies and eight Virginia police academies.  
The amount of force training conducted by the state law enforcement 
agencies represented in the survey varied significantly. The Florida Highway 
Patrol conducted the most force training: 236 hours. The Virginia State Police 
spent the most time on firearms training: 128 hours. The Utah Highway Patrol 
spent the fewest hours on force training: 42. The Washington State Patrol spent 
the fewest hours on firearms training: 48. On average, state law enforcement 
agencies spent 139 hours on force training and 90 hours on firearms training, as 
shown in Figure 12. 














The Virginia police academies spent an average of 177 hours on force 
training including 68 hours on firearms. The Chesterfield County and Henrico 
County training academies spent the most hours on force training: 220. The City 
of Newport News spent the most hours on firearms training: 111. The Roanoke 
County/City training academy spent the fewest hours on force training: 125. The 
City of Virginia Beach reported the fewest hours of basic firearms training: 40. 
See Figure 13. 












It is important to note that this survey had several limitations. First, some 
training academies provided specific information about force training rather than 
their full basic training curriculum. Second, not every police agency uses the 
same terminology. It was, therefore, difficult to determine the content of certain 
courses. For this reason, only those courses clearly force related were counted 
(i.e., firearms, non-lethal weapons, officer survival, and defensive tactics). 
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Unfortunately, the reality of policing necessitates the need to focus on 
force training. Police officers must not only recognize that each encounter is 
potentially violent, they must develop the skills needed to protect themselves and 
the community.255 It is also important to consider that even though police officers 
are authorized to use force, including deadly force, a tremendous amount of 
liability is involved for both the officer and the police agency. This fact dictates 
the need to spend an inordinate amount of basic training time on the use of 
force.256 
C. MEDIA 
The role the media has in shaping public opinion on a variety of topics 
cannot be dismissed. As with many social issues, the perception of violence by 
the American public is largely determined by the media.257 Numerous articles 
have been written about how the media presents violence and how the public 
processes that information. For instance, in an article specifically about school 
violence, Aaron Kupchik found the media relied on the general public’s emotional 
response to news about school crime and violence to perpetuate fear of such 
incidents, despite the reality that these events are very rare.258 Few things attract 
media consumers like violence. This notion was supported by David Altheide 
who writes, “Fear is more widely used today because news organizations and 
news sources have benefited from it.”259  
                                            
255 Robert W. Balch, “The Police Personality: Fact or Fiction?,” The Journal of Criminal Law, 
Criminology, and Police Science 63, no. 1 (March 1972): 109, doi:10.2307/1142281. 
256 Elsie Scott, “Managing Municipal Police Training Programs with Limited Resources,” The 
Police Chief, October 2005, http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction= 
display_arch&article_id=725&issue_id=102005. 
257 Maxwell E. McCombs, Setting the Agenda: The Mass Media and Public Opinion 
(Cambridge, UK, Malden, MA: Polity; Blackwell Pub, 2004), 18. 
258 Aaron Kupchik and Nicole L. Bracy, “The News Media on School Crime and Violence 
Constructing Dangerousness and Fueling Fear,” Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice 7, no. 2 
(April 1, 2009): 136–55, doi:10.1177/1541204008328800. 
259 David L. Altheide, Creating Fear: News and the Construction of Crisis (Piscataway, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 2002), 11. 
 73 
The national and global nature of modern media means that many people 
observe events in which they have no direct involvement. Yet, these stories and 
images play an important role in framing public opinion on many topics, including 
violence. 260 The constant news cycle and the accumulation of these tragic and 
violent images distort perceptions of violence, often leaving the viewer with an 
exaggerated view of threats. Ultimately, the way in which the media portrays 
violence has a significant impact on how consumers, including the police, 
perceive the issue.261 
For example, the statistics about violence used in the previous chapter are 
widely available to the public. Yet, the data seem to have little impact on the 
views of many Americans. Despite the fact that the FBI reports violent crime 
rates fell 12.3 percent from 2009 to 2013,262 a Gallup poll conducted in 2014 
revealed that 63 percent of Americans think crime actually got worse.263 Clearly, 
crime statistics are not the only factors affecting public perception. The author of 
the poll, Justin McCarthy, suggested that the reason for this disparity is: 
Because Americans are more pessimistic about crime in the U.S. 
as a whole as opposed to their own localities, this could suggest 
that many base their views on what they hear about crimes that 
take place outside of their own hometowns. Some argue that 
consumption of news media plays a role in this by exposing 
Americans to crimes that they may perceive as more widespread 
than actually is the case.264  
The power of the media to shape public perceptions is the subject of 
numerous articles. According to Dietram Scheufele, “Mass media actively set the 
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frames of reference that readers or viewers use to interpret and discuss public 
events.”265 Other studies have specifically found that television news coverage is 
often a primary source of the public’s distorted perceptions about crime.266 In his 
work entitled, Setting the Agenda, The Mass Media and Public Opinion, Maxwell 
McCombs writes, “Mass communication is a social process in which the same 
message, in either printed, audio or audio/visual form, is disseminated to a vast 
population. Numerous characteristics of these messages influence how many 
persons pay any attention to the message and apprehend at least some portion 
of its content.”267  
Another important factor in how the media affects public opinion is that the 
information provided to the consumer is often used to support “a version of reality 
built from personal experience, interaction with peers, and interpreted selections 
from the mass media.”268 Regina Lawrence writes, “The news is a main symbolic 
arena in which various social groups, institutions, and ideologies struggle over 
the definition and construction of social reality.”269  
Others support the notion that the media sets the narrative through which 
current events are viewed and explain why it is such a powerful force. 
Breckenridge and Zimbardo state, “the media plays a critical role in facilitating 
the psychological processes that intensify the public’s fear and sense of 
vulnerability.”270 Explaining why media portrayals of shocking events have such 
a significant impact on our perceptions, Breckenridge and Zimbardo state, 
“Public threat perceptions can escalate rapidly, outpacing rationale analysis. The 
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perception of a terrorist threat, like other public fears, can intensify in the face of 
compelling empirical disconfirmation and contrary probabilities, because human 
beings do not balance negatively and positively valenced information evenly.”271  
Once again, negativity bias and availability heuristic become important 
factors in how the public and the police process media accounts of violent 
incidents and frame socially constructed views about their prevalence. For 
example, Breckenridge and Zimbardo found, “in the aftermath of a terrorist act, 
powerfully facilitated by mass media reporting, the event is highly available thus 
elevating disproportionately the perception that another act is likely.”272 
Extensive media reporting of violent incidents have an effect on how 
police officers internalize the threat of violence. The high rate of exposure to 
intensely negative incidents makes it easy for police officers to recall violent 
encounters. It becomes a powerful determinant for the narratives that form a 
police officer’s socially constructed perception of violence.  
D. SUMMARY 
The psychological and social concepts of identity, categorization, and bias 
are well documented in the field of psychology. By applying these concepts to 
law enforcement, it is possible to begin to understand how their strong social 
identity affects their perceptions of violence. It appears that these socially 
constructed views of violence form the basis for law enforcement’s shift toward a 
militarized policing model. As police officers feel targeted and vulnerable, they 
work to find ways to counter those perceived threats. At the same time, police 
officers sense their social status within the community degrading. Their desire to 
create a distinct and positive identity is therefore threatened, which causes the 
police to further isolate themselves from the public who could potentially be the 
enemy. The result is a strong in-group who perceive their vulnerability to violence 
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as high regardless of their particular situation. Simply presenting law 
enforcement with statistics that indicate the contrary will likely be disregarded.  
The concepts presented in this chapter must be considered when 
determining what role militarization should play in law enforcement. It is critical 
that policy makers understand the inherent problems associated with the analysis 
of violent crime, as well as the powerful psychosocial processes affecting the 
police. Without this understanding, they run the risk of creating policy that could 
endanger the public, the police, or both.  
Likewise, police leaders have an obligation to both the public and the 
police. They must enact policies that protect the public from violence while 
ensuring the methods employed by the police are effective and lawful. They also 
have an obligation to provide appropriate tools and training to their officers so 
they can confront that violence within the confines of the legal system. These 
obligations are difficult to balance. However, by having an understanding of the 
concepts presented in this chapter, police leaders can develop policy that will 
meet the needs of both the police and the public.  
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V. RESPONSE CAPABILITY 
The previous two chapters explored the link between violence and police 
militarization. What emerged appears to be a contradiction. Most statistical 
measures of violence are trending downward. However, for a variety of social 
and psychological reasons, the police perceive the level of violence to be very 
high and escalating. It appears that the threat of violence has been the impetus 
for some degree of a militarized law enforcement capability.  
In just the first three weeks in June 2015, both the police and the 
community experienced numerous high profile violent attacks. For example, on 
June 13, an individual armed with explosives and high-powered rifles attacked a 
Dallas, Texas police station in an armored van. The incident was brought to a 
conclusion when a police sniper was able to shoot and kill the suspect with a .50 
caliber rifle.273 Then, on June 17, 2015, an armed assailant murdered nine 
people inside a Charleston, South Carolina church during a Bible study session. 
The incident sparked a 14-hour manhunt involving law enforcement from several 
states.274 Unfortunately, incidents like those in Dallas and Charleston are not 
anomalies. 
Speaking at the U.S. Mayors Conference in San Francisco on June 19, 
2015, President Obama made the following statements about violence in 
America, “These tragedies have become far too commonplace…More than 
11,000 Americans were killed in gun violence in 2013 alone…No reform can 
guarantee the elimination of violence…You don’t see murder on this kind of scale 
with this kind of frequency in any other advanced nation on earth.”275 
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Despite the politicized use of statistics and crime data, the threat of 
violence exists and will continue to exist. When the threat of violence becomes a 
reality, the police must be prepared, trained, and equipped to respond. Echoing 
this sentiment, Karen Singh stated:  
Law enforcement agencies in America are faced with a cavalcade 
of high-risk threats to public safety... In addition to the drug 
trade…police are faced with a host of public threats, including 
religious zealots (of many faiths), racist ideologues, the so-called 
"militia movement," foreign and domestic terrorist groups, and 
gangs. These threats are not confined to urban areas; rural police 
face many of the same social deviants the larger cities face, as well 
as other concerns unique to rural policing.276 
The violent incidents that law enforcement must contend with are not only 
real, they are continuously evolving. For this reason, the police must keep pace 
with the changing threat environment if they are to protect the communities they 
serve effectively. New tactics must be developed and new technologies 
employed. Steven Brandl writes: 
September 11 was what many have referred to as a blaring “wake-
up” call. It is now realized that Americans are not immune to 
terrorists’ actions, even on their own soil. Other serious threats may 
loom, and not only in the hypothetical. If commercial airliners can 
be turned into missiles to destroy skyscrapers filled with people, 
then bio-terrorism and the use of nuclear bombs for terrorist 
purposes is certainly a possibility. It is being realized that the 
current system of policing is ill-equipped to deal with the new 
threat.277 
The reality is that the type of preparedness, training, and equipment that 
will enable law enforcement to meet these new challenges is often the same the 
military possesses. Even staunch critics acknowledge that certain aspects of 
police militarization are necessary given the level of capability necessary to 
combat the modern threat.278  
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Therefore, it is not surprising that law enforcement agencies have taken 
advantage of programs that enable them to acquire military equipment.279 These 
resources and the manner in which they have been used are one of the most 
contentious facets of the modern police militarization debate.280  
A. FEDERAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS 
Violence, real and perceived, may be the impetus for law enforcement’s 
militarization, but its most obvious manifestation has been in the form of military 
weapons and equipment.281 Critics argue that this accumulation of military gear 
has resulted in a troubling shift in how policing is performed in the United 
States.282 Many law enforcement leaders disagree and justify the accumulation 
of military surplus equipment as an economically sound way to protect the 
community and their officers.283 
The DOD has two programs that provide equipment to LEAs. The first is 
known as the 1033 Program. Authorized by Section 1033 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act of 1997, it permits the SECDEF “to transfer, without 
charge, excess DOD property (supplies and equipment) to federal, state and 
local law enforcement agencies.”284 Pursuant to this program, the Defense 
Logistics Agency has transferred approximately $5.1 billion dollars in property to 
8,000 federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies since 1990.285 This 
transfer includes controlled property, such as weapons, ammunition, armored 
vehicles, aircraft, and commercial grade night vision devices. 
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The 1112 Program permits government agencies (state and local) to 
purchase new law enforcement equipment specifically for counter-narcotic 
activities.286 The advantage of this program is that it allows police agencies to 
save a tremendous amount of money by leveraging the federal government’s 
large volume pricing discounts. This program does not allow LEAs to purchase 
controlled property. 
A number of federal programs also provide money directly to LEAs 
through various grants, such as the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance 
Grant Program, The Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Office, and 
the Department of Justice Equitable Sharing Program. According to a White 
House report, “Between FY2009 and FY2014, the federal government provided 
nearly $18 billion dollars in funds and resources to support programs that provide 
equipment and tactical resources to state and local LEAs.”287  
The main source of controversy has been with the DOD 1033 Program. 
Over 18,000 different types of equipment have been received by law 
enforcement agencies, the majority of which are not weapons or related to 
combat in any way.288 According to a White House report, only about four 
percent of the equipment received under the DOD 1033 Program in 2013 was 
considered controlled property.289 Nevertheless, about 460,000 controlled items 
are currently in the hands of law enforcement.290 
In response to public concern about law enforcement access to military 
equipment, President Obama enacted several modifications to the 1033 
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Program. First, Executive Order (EO) 13688 created a revised “Prohibited 
Equipment List.”291 Items now included on this list are the following: 
 
Tracked armored vehicles 
Weaponized aircraft/vessels/vehicles 





Prohibited equipment will no longer be available to LEAs through federal 
programs because, according to the EO, such equipment in the hands of law 
enforcement has “the substantial risk of misusing or overusing these items, which 
are seen as militaristic in nature, could significantly undermine community trust 
and may encourage tactics and behaviors that are inconsistent with the premise 
of civilian law enforcement.”292 However, law enforcement may continue to 
obtain such items through other avenues provided they can secure the 
necessary funding. 
Second, the EO created a revised “controlled equipment list.” 293 The 
following items are now included: 
 
manned aircraft 
un-manned aerial vehicles 
wheeled armored vehicles 
wheeled tactical vehicles 
command and control vehicles 
specialized firearms and ammunition 
under .50-caliber 
explosive and pyrotechnics 
breaching apparatus 
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Items on the controlled equipment list are available through federal 
programs with certain restrictions, such as mandatory training and enhanced 
accountability mandates.294 The EO states that despite the fact that these items 
could be viewed as militaristic, they “also have significant utility to law 
enforcement operations.”295 Referring specifically to armored vehicles, which 
have been the subject of much criticism, the report states, “These vehicles can 
provide critical officer and civilian safety protection and transport into and out of 
high-risk situations and therefore should not be prohibited.”296  
It is worth noting that many of the most contentious items obtained by law 
enforcement via the old DOD 1033 Program guidelines are still available. For 
example, armored vehicles, such as the much publicized MRAP, are still 
authorized for use by law enforcement because of their utility as a protective 
measure.297 The EO acknowledges that some of the controlled property looks 
intimidating, but is not an instrument of force, an important distinction. If the 
definition of police militarization as found in Chapter II is valid (i.e., the adoption 
of military style equipment, tactics, and/or policies that leverage force or the 
threat of force as the primary means to achieve a law enforcement agency’s 
goals), then the vast majority of the items on both the prohibited and controlled 
equipment lists have no nexus to police militarization.  
The equipment made available to law enforcement through the 1033 
Program has improved their ability to respond to violent incidents and 
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undoubtedly saved lives.298 Law enforcement SWAT teams have 
commandeered much of that equipment. 
B. TACTICAL RESPONSE CAPABILITIES 
The 1033 Program has enabled police agencies of all sizes to obtain 
equipment that was beyond the reach of their budgets.299 Numerous examples of 
small police departments obtaining armored vehicles and military style weapons 
are available.300 Critics argue that the free equipment caused a tremendous 
increase in the number of police SWAT teams.301 These specific police units 
have actively acquired military equipment and capabilities in an effort to keep 
pace with emerging violent threats. 302  
SWAT teams have been at the heart of the police militarization debate. 
Some argue that SWAT teams have enabled law enforcement agencies to rely 
on force as a primary means of policing, which ultimately endangers the 
public.303 Kraska has been particularly critical of their proliferation and use. 
According to his research, the use of police SWAT teams from 1980 to 1997 
increased 538 percent.304 Kraska views the use of SWAT teams as particularly 
troublesome. He states, “[t]he militarism inherent in PPUs escalates to new 
heights the cynical view that the most expedient route to solving social problems 
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is through military-style force, weaponry, and technology.”305 He asserts that a 
potential problem with the proliferation of SWAT teams occurs when, “Instead of 
viewing paramilitary tactics as an option of last resort…the police may come to 
view this approach not only as a necessary but indeed even a pleasurable part of 
policing.”306 Other studies have indicated that SWAT officers are not more prone 
to use force than non-SWAT officers.307 
SWAT teams are often considered controversial because they are relied 
upon to handle unpredictable and dangerous assignments that make it more 
likely they will be involved in tragic incidents.308 An article entitled, “War Comes 
Home—The Excessive Militarization of American Policing,” documents numerous 
incidents involving SWAT teams that resulted in tragic accidents.309 However, 
the article failed to account for the lack of planning, training, and experience as a 
factor in any of the documented incidents. Rather, the article generally 
condemned the use of SWAT teams. Similarly, Balko criticizes the use of SWAT 
teams but acknowledges that thoughtful policy changes could lead to much safer 
and more effective use of this resource.310 
Unfortunately, without the capabilities of police SWAT teams, viable 
options are not available to deal with these dangerous, highly volatile situations. 
Unlike many other countries that have the authority to leverage military resources 
quickly to assist law enforcement, this practice is largely prohibited in the United 
States.311  
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C. MILITARY RESPONSE 
The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 was meant to place clear restrictions on 
the use of military resources for domestic purposes. The act specifically banned 
the utilization of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus, which was a 
common law term that referred to all males over the age of 15 who the sheriff 
could call upon for assistance in the event of civil disorder.312  
Numerous statutes and exceptions authorize the President to utilize 
military force to quell revolutions and enforce federal law. These laws are found 
in 10 USC §§ 331–335. A separate set of laws that permit the use of military 
information, equipment, and personnel in certain situations are found in 10 USC 
§§ 371–382. 
The confusion caused by these various competing policies is the subject 
of an article written by Stephan Vladeck, which appeared in the Yale Law 
Journal. In his article, he states that the wording of the President’s Emergency 
Powers and Militia Acts seem fairly straightforward but the various interpretations 
and real world applications make it far from being so. In his conclusion, he states:  
[W]hatever power the President currently possesses to declare and 
impose a state of martial law in an emergency is ill defined… it is 
manifestly unclear whether courts could have any role in policing 
the actions of a future President in responding to a serious crisis, 
and it is just as unclear what specific powers the President has by 
virtue of the Militia Acts, what specific actions are foreclosed to him, 
and where the gray area is with regard to triggers for various levels 
of authority.313 
While disagreement certainly exists about the role the military can or 
should play in domestic law enforcement, it is clear that the military will not be 
able to supplant state and local law enforcement as first responders to the 
numerous violent incidents that occur each year. These incidents necessitate an 
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almost immediate response by law enforcement; something the military is not 
currently capable of doing domestically. 
D. MAINTAINING CAPABILITY 
Certainly, the debate will continue about the frequency with which violent 
incidents occur. The fact that violent incidents do happen is not in dispute. 
History is rife with shocking examples of violent encounters, many of which 
involve firearms. Each of these incidents has had a dramatic affect on the way in 
which the police respond to such tragedies because they often exposed 
weaknesses in their capabilities.314 Two of these cases are particularly notable 
as they relate to police militarization.  
The first case is the Columbine High School Shooting on April 20, 1999. 
The significance of this case was discussed in Chapter III. The second case was 
the North Hollywood Shootout. This incident took place on February 28, 1997 in 
Los Angeles, CA. This incident began as a bank robbery and ended with one of 
the fiercest gun battles in law enforcement history. The two suspects attempted 
to rob a Bank of America branch in the San Fernando Valley. During the robbery, 
two Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers spotted the suspects 
entering the bank and were waiting for them as they exited. For the next 44 
minutes, the suspects and police exchanged gunfire. Since the suspects were 
wearing approximately 40 pounds of body armor, they were able to withstand the 
barrage of gunfire by the LAPD despite receiving numerous direct hits.315 This 
incident was the impetus for many law enforcement agencies to purchase and 
equip their officers with high-powered long rifles due to the ineffectiveness of 
their issued pistols and shotguns.316  
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What is evident from these two cases and many more throughout history 
is that criminals will continue to change their methods and utilize all the tools and 
weapons available to them in furtherance of their objectives. Law enforcement 
can no longer be reactive to these changes. To have any chance at mitigating 
the effects of the next Columbine or North Hollywood, law enforcement must be 
adequately trained and equipped to deal with current and future types of violent 
incidents. For the reasons identified in this chapter, the military will never be a 
viable alternative for these rapidly developing violent incidents. It is therefore 
incumbent upon this nation’s police forces to maintain the extraordinary response 
capabilities often associated with a militarized policing model.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Americans now live in an interconnected society with instant access to an 
enormous amount of unfiltered information. Social issues once confined to the 
ethereal boundaries of America’s towns and cities, now frequently have 
cascading effects regionally, nationally, and globally. Thus, Ferguson, Missouri, a 
city with a population of 21,000, became the focal point of the national debate on 
police militarization.317  
A. LESSONS LEARNED 
One of the lessons from Ferguson is that social problems are often 
complex and multi-faceted. They are not, however, impossible to solve. Doing so 
requires a comprehensive understanding of the challenges and their 
interconnection with a variety of other social issues. In many ways, the debate 
about police militarization in Ferguson was simply the initial manifestation of a 
much broader set of social, political, and economic challenges within that 
community.  
National concerns about police militarization have become a contentious 
issue with significant public safety and homeland security implications. For many, 
the term invokes images of battle ready troops toting high-powered automatic 
weapons while violating civil rights. Others see police militarization as a 
necessary progression of police tactics in response to an increasingly 
unpredictable and dangerous world. Unfortunately, misguided attempts at police 
militarization reform could have serious repercussions on the police and the 
communities they serve. The goal of this project was to provide clarification on 
two key issues related to the topic of police militarization to inform future policy 
decisions.  
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The first issue addressed by the research was the establishment of a 
comprehensive definition of the term police militarization that could satisfy the 
concerns of both the community and the police by synthesizing the various 
components of police militarization as found in the available literature. Based on 
this synthesis, police militarization was defined as the adoption of military style 
equipment, tactics, and/or policies that leverage force or the threat of force as the 
primary means to achieve a law enforcement agency’s goals.  
What became clear from the research is that police militarization is not a 
single thing. It is not a weapon, or an armored vehicle, or a uniform. It is also not 
synonymous with police misconduct or abuse of authority. Ultimately, police 
militarization is the proactive application of force. As such, police militarization is 
neither inherently good nor bad. Its utility is determined by the purpose and 
manner in which it is applied.  
The second issue addressed by the research was the correlation between 
police militarization and violence through an analysis of the national aggregate 
data on violent crime. The research revealed that a causal relationship between 
the statistical prevalence of violent crime at the national level and police 
militarization did not exist. In fact, during the three decades of data examined in 
this research, an inverse relationship occurred between violent crime and police 
militarization. At the same time, while indicators of police militarization were 
increasing, violent crime statistics were decreasing.  
An important outcome of the research was the distinct limitations that 
resulted from using national data on violence. First, the research indicated that a 
significant number of violent crimes go unreported, and therefore, are not 
factored into the national statistics. Second, national violent crime trends are not 
representative of the violent crime rates in many American communities. In fact, 
several communities reported record levels of violent crime during the time 
period studied despite national trends to the contrary.318 
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The research did find a strong nexus between law enforcement’s 
perceived threat of violence and levels of police militarization. By applying social 
identity theory to the law enforcement community, it was discovered that a police 
officer’s perceived threat of violence is the product of a socially constructed 
reality rooted in law enforcement’s strong group identity and reinforced through 
training and media. The findings of this research are extremely important to 
understanding the cause of police militarization and police officers’ viewpoint and 
reaction to violence. It is critical that police and community leaders have an 
understanding of these complex psychosocial concepts as they work to develop 
policies that address police militarization, as well as larger social issues.  
For example, one of the often-cited negative aspects of police 
militarization is that it can perpetuate an adversarial relationship between the 
police and the public.319 Finding ways to repair that relationship has been a 
pressing concern for police and community leaders.320 Many efforts to improve 
police/community relations have focused solely on changing law enforcement’s 
behavior by demanding new levels of accountability and creating 
transparency.321 While sound practices, the results of the research presented in 
this thesis suggest that meaningful change must also come from outside the law 
enforcement community.  
It is important to understand how national and perhaps global incidents of 
violence will affect the law enforcement community. As law enforcement’s 
perception of threat is based on a socially constructed reality, violent incidents, 
regardless of where they occur, become part of law enforcement’s collective 
experience. Each of these violent incidents strengthens their perception of 
vulnerability. The ease with which these incidents can be recalled (i.e., 
availability heuristic) adds to their perceived threat of violence. It explains why 
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police officers, even those in areas with very low levels of violence, often 
perceive the threat of violence to be high. It also offers an explanation as to why 
police officers sometimes react very aggressively to seemingly innocuous 
situations.  
Police militarization reforms are currently underway. President Obama 
recently implemented new regulations for the DOD 1033 and other military 
surplus programs. Maryland has implemented strict state mandates regarding the 
use of SWAT teams that include the maintenance of activation and deployment 
information.322 Other states and localities have implemented similar 
requirements.  
One of the biggest challenges for law enforcement leaders grappling with 
the issue of police militarization is to find the appropriate balance between the 
safety of the public and the safety of their officers.323 Segments of the public 
have been lead to believe that militarization is an abuse of government authority 
and an infringement of civil liberties. Many police officers see militarization as the 
only realistic response to increasing levels of violence despite the lack of 
evidence to support such claims.  
Clearly violent incidents will continue to occur in the United States. The 
military is largely prohibited from engaging in law enforcement missions and they 
are currently incapable of responding fast enough to deal with high consequence 
violent acts effectively. In other words, law enforcement will have to maintain 
some degree of militarized capability. Without it, the military will be forced to 
someday intervene, which would confirm the fears of this nation’s Founding 
Fathers. 
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B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
A number of issues related to police militarization were beyond the scope 
of this project but need to be addressed to develop sensible reform to police 
militarization policies. The first is the role of economics in militarization. Some 
evidence suggests law enforcement has created an artificial need for military 
style weapons and equipment to take advantage of federal surplus programs, 
such as the DOD 1033 Program. The argument is that police agencies are 
pressured to use the equipment, even when unnecessary to justify additional 
requests. Understanding the effect of diminishing budgets on the acquisition of 
surplus and grant funded equipment is critical to implementing police 
militarization reforms. 
A second issue that would benefit from additional research is the effect of 
militarized policing on the public. Much of the existing literature on the subject 
refers to the negative effect of police militarization on society, but offers little 
statistical or empirical data to support these claims. Rather, many authors justify 
this position by referring to incidents in which someone was injured or killed 
because of militarized police action. Additionally, high profile incidents involving a 
militarized policing presence often garner negative attention. Typical examples of 
this type of police activity include manhunts and responses to incidents of civil 
disturbance. However, it is unclear whether that negative attention is due to 
police militarization, or a reaction to the event which precipitated law 
enforcement’s response. Understanding the actual cause of the public’s 
perception of the police response during these incidents would be of great value 
as the police militarization debate continues. 
Third, a need exists to develop a more effective approach to how law 
enforcement maintains the response capabilities typical of militarized policing. 
For instance, a tremendous amount of duplicative capabilities appears to occur 
within law enforcement. According to a 1996 survey by Peter Kraska, 89.4 
percent of police agencies with a population of at least 50,000 had a paramilitary 
 94 
police unit, aka SWAT team.324 According to the National Review, by 2005, 
approximately 80 percent of towns with a population between 25,000 and 50,000 
had SWAT capability.325 Research is needed to determine if some of these cities 
and towns that have varying levels of SWAT capability also have access to either 
regional or state SWAT resources. This information would be valuable in 
determining the appropriate level of response capability each police agency 
needs. Maintaining only the level of capability that is necessary would be a 
tremendous cost saving measure and help reduce the chance that a jurisdiction 
could become over militarized. 
Finally, a number of controversial incidents in the last few years have 
involved allegations of excessive force by police officers and/or incidents in which 
a seemingly innocuous encounter between the public and the police escalated 
inappropriately. The concepts presented in Chapter IV regarding social identity 
and socially constructed reality can be applied to many aspects of policing and 
appear to have value in addressing these serious public safety concerns. 
Understanding these concepts and their effect on the interaction between law 
enforcement and the community is critical to implementing meaningful police 
reform.  
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